This paper analyzes the use of public reason requirements in bioethical discourse and discusses when such requirements are warranted. By a “public reason requirement,” I mean a requirement that those involved in a particular discourse or debate only use reasons that can properly be described as public reasons. The first part of the paper outlines the concept of public reasons as developed by John Rawls and others and discusses some of the general criticisms of the concept and its importance. The (...) second part then distinguishes between two types of public reason requirements in bioethics. One type is what I will call the orthodox public reason requirement since it hews closely to the original Rawlsian conception. The second is what I will call the expansive public reason requirement, which departs quite radically from the Rawlsian conception and applies the requirement not to policy discourse or policymaking, but to the actions of individuals. Both types of requirements will be analyzed, and some problems in applying public reason requirements in bioethics will be identified. It will be argued that the expansive public reason requirement is misguided. The concluding part argues that requirements of civic civility and what Rawls terms an “inclusive view” of public reason should be important in bioethical discourse. (shrink)

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To be clear, I do not think that blood transfusions necessarily...

This article describes and rejects three standard views of reason in secular clinical ethics. The first, instrumental reason view, affirms that reason may be used to draw conceptual distinctions, map moral geography, and identify invalid forms of argumentation, but prohibits recommendations because reason cannot justify any content-full moral or metaphysical commitments. The second, public reason view, affirms instrumental reason, and claims ethicists may make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of bioethical consensus. The third, comprehensive reason view, also (...) affirms instrumental reason, but encourages ethicists to make recommendations grounded in the moral and metaphysical commitments of their private worldviews. A compatibilist view of public reason is then defended, which holds that each standard view captures an important role for reason in different aspects of secular clinical ethics. The article ends by identifying three implications for enduring theoretical debates in clinical ethics. (shrink)

I support Abram Brummett’s contention that there is a need for secular clinical ethics to acknowledge that various positions typically advocated for by ethicists, concerning bedside decision-making and broader policy-making, rely upon metaphysical commitments that are not often explicit. I further note that calls for “neutrality” in debates concerning conscientious refusals to provide legal health care services—such as elective abortion or medical aid-in-dying—may exhibit biases against specific metaphysical claims regarding, for instance, the ontological and moral status of fetuses or the (...) valuing of the phenomena of life, suffering, and dying/death, as constitutive of medicine’s internal morality as a profession. I conclude that there is an operative distinction between metaphysical views founded essentially upon religious tenets and those founded upon rationally defensible premises. (shrink)

Baby A1 was born prematurely with severe encephalopathy, injured brainstem, and a potentially injured spinal cord. He had no response to pain or other external stimuli. The neonatal team unanimousl...

Bioethicists often remind health care professionals to pay close attention to issues of diversity and inclusion. Approaches to ethics consultation, where the perspective of the bioethicist is taken to be more morally correct or necessarily authoritative, have been critiqued as inappropriately authoritarian. Despite such apparent recognition of the importance of respecting moral diversity and the inclusion of different viewpoints, authoritarianism is all too often the approach adopted, especially as bioethics has shifted evermore into concerns for public policy. Yet, secular values (...) and philosophical principles are not morally neutral; nor are the private moral convictions of bioethicists. Such analysis is always grounded in particular understandings of the right and the good, the virtuous and the just. Critical examination of common treatments and new alternatives is essential for the careful scientific practice of medicine. The same is true with regard to bioethics. Stagnating in customary or accepted claims of a common secular morality or a standard set of bioethical principles out of an unwillingness to explore the real diversity of moral thought, including traditional religious and cultural worldviews, fails to tap the human capacity to find innovative solutions to the complex challenges facing medicine. (shrink)

“Outsiders” addressing ethical issues in medicine—Strangers at the Bedside —became “bioethicists.” Bioethicists providing research ethics consultation have been described as “stranger...

The emergence and development of the field of clinical ethics coincided with the revitalization of moral philosophy following the publication of John Rawls’ ma...

Every clinical ethics consultant, no matter their own spirituality, will meet patients, families, and healthcare professionals whose spiritualities anchor their moral worldviews. How might ethicists respond to those who rely on spirituality when making medical decisions? And further, should ethicists incorporate their own spiritual commitments into their clinical analyses and recommendations? These questions prompt reflection on foundational issues in the philosophy of medicine, political and moral theory, and methods of proper clinical ethics consultation. Rather than attempting to offer definitive answers (...) to these questions, this essay prompts readers to consider their own answers to these questions. Specifically, it offers a taxonomic analysis of six (6) distinct responses: assessment, delegation, examination, translation, incorporation, and assertion. Furthermore, this essay describes the role of the ethicist’s own spiritual commitments during the responses. Each section also names several strengths and weaknesses that ethicists ought to consider when evaluating the purpose and scope of each response. This paper prompts readers to consider circumstances under which they might promote, critique, or incorporate spiritual worldviews—their own and those of their patients—when offering clinical analyses and recommendations. (shrink)

Brummett argues that P2+ is necessary because it acknowledges the metaphysical claims ignored in P2’s approach in addressing parental refusal for treatment in certain pediatric cases that cl...