We can see a number of entities without seeing a determinate number of entities. For example, when we see the speckled hen, we do not see it as having a determinate number of speckles, although we do see it as having a lot of speckles. How is this possible? I suggest a contextualist answer that differs both from Michael Tye's and from Fred Dretske's.

In his , Williams offered a solution to Moore's paradox that centred on the concept of justification. Consider the omissive Moore-paradoxical sentence: p and I do not believe that p.Williams appealed to the principle Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.Suppose that I am justified in believing . Then I am justified in believing its first conjunct. By I am justified in believing that I believe that p. Since I am also (...) justified in believing the second conjunct, I am justified in believing that I do not believe that p. Williams claimed that ‘this is impossible, because anything that justifies me in believing that something is the case renders me unjustified in believing that it is not the case’ . 1In a response to Williams, I argued that is false. Williams concedes this objection, and in Williams he seeks to offer a variant on his justificationist solution to Moore's paradox that does not rest upon . Consider this instance of . There will be a third world war, and I do not believe that there will be a third world war.Suppose that I am justified in believing the first conjunct on …. (shrink)