In After God: Morality & Bioethics in a Secular Age, Professor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. argues that the now dominant intellectual culture of the West actively shuns any transcendent point of orientation, such as an appeal to God or to a God’s eye perspective on reality. Instead, it seeks to frame its understanding of reality and morality, and thus its bioethics, without reference to any foundation outside of particular human concerns. This article explores the implications of living in a secular (...) culture that eschews any appeal to a fully objective perspective on reality. Drawing on Engelhardt’s analysis, it argues that absent access to a binding moral standpoint that is not already conditioned by a particular society, culture, or place in history, all moral and bioethical commitments are merely contingent, subject to particular human interests, aesthetic inclinations, personal intuitions, idiosyncratic choices, and political objectives. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 50-52.

Zusammenfassung Krankenhäuser müssen sich an der ethischen Qualität ihrer Versorgung messen lassen. Es geht dabei um einen Zustand, in dem allgemein anerkannte moralische Normen in der Patient:innenversorgung konsequent berücksichtigt werden. Damit sind zwei Ebenen angesprochen: die der ethisch-normativen Deutung und die der Gestaltung intra- und interpersonaler Prozesse. Die Klinische Ethik ist die Disziplin, die in der Verbindung beider ihre zentrale Aufgabe sieht. Um sie zu erfüllen, muss Ethikarbeit auf der Basis komplexer Kompetenzen erfolgen. Neben fundiertem Ethikwissen ist das Beherrschen von (...) geeigneten Methoden für die Steuerung solcher Prozesse eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung. Dazu aber ist die Studienlage vergleichsweise dünn. Die vorliegende Arbeit greift dieses Desiderat auf und geht dabei von der Hypothese aus, dass die Systemik einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einer im obigen Sinne effektiven Ethikarbeit leisten kann. Die Darstellung gibt einen Einblick in das systemische Denken und diskutiert die Möglichkeiten, die systemisches Handwerkszeug für die Herausforderungen der Klinischen Ethik bereithält. Die Ausführungen laden dazu ein, über den Einfluss systemischer Grundannahmen und Methoden auf die Gestaltung einer effektiven Ethikarbeit nachzudenken. Darüber hinaus ruft dieser Beitrag dazu auf, die Beratungsmethodik als solche mehr in den Fokus zu rücken. (shrink)

Definition of the problemQuality of care also includes a professional approach to ethical challenges. This involves the moral interpretation of an issue and the management of intra- and interpersonal reflection processes. Combining both is the central task of clinical ethics consultation (CEC). Despite its importance only a few studies have dealt with the appropriate methods for steering reflection processes.ArgumentsCEC requires a theory-based and methodological approach. The argumentation shows the effects that systems theory and systemic methods have on the effectiveness of (...) CEC. The main methods such as clarification of mandates and handling complexity are presented, and their impact on dealing with ethical challenges is shown through the discussion of two cases.ConclusionThe paper provides insight into systems thinking. It discusses the influence that systemic tools have on dealing with typical challenges within clinical ethics counselling. It also shows how specific counselling methods impact a normative level. (shrink)

In the process of professionalization, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has emphasized process and knowledge as core competencies for clinical ethics consultants; however, the credentialing program launched in 2018 fails to address both pillars. The inadequacy of this program recalls earlier critiques of the professionalization effort made by Giles R. Scofield and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.. Both argue that ethics consultation is not a profession and the effort to professionalize is motivated by self-interest. One argument they offer (...) against professionalization is that ethics consultants lack normative expertise. Although the question of expertise cannot be resolved completely, the accusation of self-interest can be addressed. Underlying these critiques is a concern for hubris, which can be addressed in certification and the vetting of candidates. Drawing on the virtue ethics literature of Alasdair MacIntyre and Edmund D. Pellegrino, I argue that medicine is a moral community in which ethics consultants are moral agents with a duty to foster the virtue of humility (or what Pellegrino and Thomasma call self-effacement). The implications of this argument include a requirement for self-reflection in one’s role as a moral agent and reflection on one’s progress toward developing or deepening virtuous engagement with the moral community of medicine. I recommend that professionalization of clinical ethics consultants include a self-reflective narrative component in the initial certification and ongoing renewal of certification where clinical ethics consultants address the emotional dimensions of their work as well as their own moral development. Adopting a teleological view of ethics consultation and incorporating narratives that work toward that purpose will mitigate the self-interest and hubris of the professionalization project. (shrink)

Abram Brummett and Christopher Ostertag offer critiques of my argument that clinical ethics consultants have expertise but are not “ethics experts”. My argument begins within our less-than-ideal world and asks what a justification of a clinical ethics consultation recommendation might look like under those conditions. It is a challenge to what could be called an “inflationary” position on ethics expertise that requires agreement on or rational proof of metaethical facts about the values at stake in clinical ethics consultation. Brummett and (...) Ostertag critique three distinct steps in the argument. Two of those I have a brief answer for, and an assessment of the third demonstrates that Brummett and Ostertag do not consider the premise upon which I based my account. Instead, they assert a counter-premise without argument, which at best results in a stalemate between our two accounts. However, the reasons supporting my premise still seem to me to be stronger, so I am in the end unconvinced by their critiques. (shrink)

Law’s processes are likely always to be needed when particularly intractable conflicts arise in relation to the care of a critically ill child like Charlie Gard. Recourse to law has its merits, but it also imposes costs, and the courts’ decisions about the best interests of such children appear to suffer from uncertainty, unpredictability and insufficiency. The insufficiency arises from the courts’ apparent reluctance to enter into the ethical dimensions of such cases. Presuming that such reflection is warranted, this article (...) explores alternatives to the courts, and in particular the merits of specialist ethics support services, which appear to be on the rise in the UK. Such specialist services show promise, as they are less formal and adversarial than the courts and they appear capable of offering expert ethical advice. However, further research is needed into such services – and into generalist ethics support services – in order to gauge whether this is indeed a promising development. (shrink)