Minsky’s theory of financial instability helps clarify how Marxist theory can explain the highly financialised capitalism of today, and the crisis which started in 2008. The advanced economies currently have high realised profits in the productive sector and lagging rates of investment. Shareholder pressures encourage corporate strategies which focus on stock-market ratings and M&A operations, less on productive investment. Tax evasion and the build-up of reserve cash piles by corporations have contributed to a global surplus of what Marx called loanable (...) capital. This surplus has been augmented by the increasing inequality of personal wealth ownership and, in the international economy by, large current-account surpluses. The results include: huge profits for the financial system; low interest rates; recurrent boom and bust in asset markets; the fuelling of huge increases in household and government debt; and the combination of instability and stagnation which results from an excess supply of loanable capital. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the debate on the role of financial derivatives for capitalism. It responds to Bryan and Rafferty’s defence of their analysis and their critique of my own. The paper argues that their analysis confuses what a financial derivative does, and mixes together different kinds of derivative – and non-derivative – that play very different roles. After detailing these points, the paper discusses the relationship between gold, money and derivatives, rejecting their notion that derivatives are some kind of (...) new ‘commodity money’. An important theme absent from Bryan and Rafferty’s analysis is the relationship of financial trading and derivatives markets to parasitism in the imperialist world economy. To illustrate this, the paper notes advantages enjoyed by the major financial powers – the US and the UK – that are the main centres for the origination of derivatives and for derivatives trading. (shrink)

Financial derivatives have been singled out as the major villain in the latest crisis, particularly through speculative trading by banks. Yet little attention has been paid to the fundamental rôle that derivatives play in modern capitalism. Even less has there been a focus on how the boom in derivatives-trading was prompted by the crisis of profitability and capital-accumulation. This article shows that while derivatives were one means by which speculation took off, the momentum behind this was driven by low profitability. (...) That was why banks turned their mortgage-loans into derivative-driven securities, why pension-funds placed bets on commodity-futures and why countries such as Greece used derivatives to hide the real state of their finances. Derivatives helped determine the form and magnitude of the crisis, but were not its underlying cause. Proposed reforms of the derivatives-market ignore the fundamental determinants of the financial crisis, assuming it to be a failure of regulation. (shrink)

In light of the structural role of computational technology in the expansion of modern global finance, this essay investigates the ontology of contemporary markets starting from a reformulation of liquidity—one of the tenets of financial trading. Focusing on the nexus between financial and algorithmic flows, the paper complements contemporary philosophies of the market with insights into recent theories of computation, emphasizing the functional role of contingency, both for market trading and algorithmic processes. Considering the increasing adoption of advanced computational methods (...) in automated trading strategies, this article argues that the event of price is the direct manifestation of the incomputability at the heart of market exchange. In doing so, it questions the ontological assumptions of “flow” and “fluidity” underpinning traditional conceptions of liquidity and challenges the notion of rationality in market behavior. Ultimately, the paper gestures toward some of the social and political consequences of this reformulation. (shrink)

As the economy has grown increasingly financialized, the relationship between financial innovation and instability has attracted more attention. Previous research finds that the proliferation of complex financial innovations, like asset securitization and new financial derivatives, helped to erode the market governance arrangements that kept excessive bank risk-taking in check, inviting instability. This article presents an alternative way of understanding how financial innovations and market governance arrangements combine to shape instability. Market governance arrangements also shape how financial firmsreceiveinnovations, leading to greater (...) or lesser instability at particular times and places. I illustrate this argument by tracing the effects of changing corporate governance arrangements at large US banks in the 1990s and 2000s. Like non-financial firms in the preceding decade, banks adopted reforms associated with the shareholder value model of corporate governance. These changes to internal bank governance arrangements affected the agendas of bank executives in ways that encouraged expanded use of securitization and derivatives. Drawing from this case, I argue that a full understanding of instability in the financialized era requires closer attention to the (institutionally-structured) interests of financial innovationusers—not just to features of financial innovations themselves. (shrink)