In a recent article, Alexander Bryan and Ioannis Kouris argue that the concept of exploitation should be a “central preoccupation” of republican economic thought. While I concur that republicans should be interested in exploitation, I will argue that they should only do so because of the instrumental harms of exploitation. I will argue that contrary to those theorists who see exploitation as inherently wrongful because exploiters steal something that should rightfully belong to the exploited, republicans should see exploitative relations of (...) domination as objectionable only because dominators who exploit will usually be able to reproduce and extend their power more effectively than dominators who do not. When analyzing the instrumental harms produced by exploitation, however, I argue that republicans should not focus on individual relationships of exploitation, but on relationships where dominators successfully extract an aggregate surplus from the collective of people they dominate. If I am right, exploitation should not be a central normative concept of republican economic analysis, though it should still play an important role in explaining how relations of domination persist and spread. (shrink)

In recent literature on the philosophical foundations of socialism a growing number of theorists have endorsed the claim that freedom as non-domination is a fundamental normative commitment undergirding socialist politics. On this sort of view, a broad range of traditional socialist claims can be explained and justified by reference to freedom as non-domination. In this paper, I argue that even if these theorists are right that opposition to domination is a core socialist normative commitment, it is not clear that that (...) opposition is best understood in terms of a commitment to a particular conception of freedom. Instead, socialist opposition to domination can be more fruitfully understood as flowing from a commitment to a relational conception of equality, according to which relationships with a substantially egalitarian character have a special value. I argue, first, that a relational egalitarian construal of socialist opposition to domination can retain all of the benefits of the freedom as non-domination construal, and, secondly, that a relational egalitarian account will have benefits that a freedom as non-domination approach will lack. I conclude that there are still significant benefits to retaining a place for equality in our considered account of the normative foundations of socialism. (shrink)