In this article I take as my starting point the economist, Jeremy Rifkin's, claims about the rise of what he calls the ‘collaborative commons’. For Rifkin, this is nothing less than the emergence of a new economic paradigm where traditional consumers exploit the possibilities of technology, and position themselves as ‘pro-sumers’. This emphasises their role in production rather than consumption alone, and shows how they aim to bypass a range of capitalist markets, from publishing to the music industry. In asking (...) how education is situated in relation to the collaborative commons, I consider the growth in technology-driven, cost-negative services as a response to the current market in higher education. This raises the issue of what we mean by ‘collaboration’ in the university, and how this might be different from, for example, cooperation or teamwork. In seeking to provide a richer conception of collaboration in higher education, I look to Martin Buber's concept of the relational act and the life of dialogue, and to some of the seminal work of Ronald Barnett on the philosophy and economics of higher education. The article suggests that these concepts afford a new perspective on collaboration that amount to a new economics for education. Such economics require a radical shift in how we perceive the role of responsibility, reciprocity and the educative possibilities of conversation. (shrink)

What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in (...) one another's presence, where the latter is a matter of second-personal standing or authority, as in the divine presence or in the king's presence. To be with someone is, therefore, to give the other second-personal standing, implicitly, to claim it for oneself and, thus, to enter into a relation of mutual accountability. Second-personal relating, I argue, requires a distinctive form of empathy, projective empathy, through which we imaginatively occupy others' perspectives and view ourselves as if from their point of view. Projective empathy is thus an essential constituent of “being with.” But it is not the only form of empathy that being with typically involves. Further, I discuss ways in which emotional contagion, affect attunement, as well as projective empathy typically enter into the complex psychological (and ethical) phenomenon of being with another person. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of dialogue in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, with a focus on the context of education. Its aim is to create a conversation between the Lévinasian theory and the theories of other philosophers, especially Martin Buber, in an effort to highlight the ethical significance that Lévinas assigns to the act of dialogue itself. As a philosopher whose essential interest was trained on the infinite ethical responsibility of the human subject, Lévinas places major emphasis on the (...) ethical meaning of dialogue. On a more fundamental level, he considers the ethics that precede dialogue and enable it to exist, as well as the individual's acceptance of responsibility during dialogue stemming from his recognition of the alterity of the Other. (shrink)

Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile (...) w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości. (shrink)

Dans l'éthique d’Emmanuel Levinas, les animaux ne peuvent répondre à l’exigence éthique, pas plus qu’ils ne peuvent être l'Autre de qui l’exigence émane. La caractérisation de l’Autre en tant qu'humain opérée par Levinas semble être incompatible avec sa description d’Autrui comme infiniment transcendantal et avec sa conception du visage refusant d’être contenu. Un correctif peut être trouvé dans la version bidimensionnelle de la rencontre décrite par Martin Buber. Buber élargit le champ des entités avec lesquelles des rencontres moralement exigeantes sont (...) possibles. Compléter la version lévinassienne de la rencontre avec celle de Buber permet de reconnaître les animaux non humains en tant qu’Autres dans la rencontre morale. (shrink)

Buber’s and Kant’s views as to how to achieve mutual respect are intertwined, contrary to the way each would likely see the other’s position. To this end, the author discussed each writer’s view of mutual respect and shows how the deficiencies in each are made up for in the arguments of the other. The author concludes by suggesting that a conception of liberal civil society, at its best and most democratic, embodied both Buber’s and Kant’s views of mutual respect.

A brand is a complex construction. In addition to its tangible and intangible dimensions, it implies an intrinsic relational dimension associated to any brand building process. The relational dimension is even more visible in the case of the political brand. The political brand brings with it a symbolic construction in which the experience of a diffuse form of sacredness is central, by the presence of the inadequate report specific to the manifestations related to the sacred representations. On the one hand, (...) we are experiencing a meeting that creates the context of identity, and on the other hand a cohabitation that highlights the role of alterity. The brand imposes itself as a symbolic construction based on this game of identity and alterity in a global communication market. Communication advisers must pay attention to this symbolic dimension. It is the expressive form in which interpersonal relationships manifest themselves as assuming the values and meanings that individuals place under the idea of having a better life. The orientation towards the development of political brands understood as personal brands corresponds to a phase of professionalization of politics and political communication in electoral campaigns, but also in the stages between campaigns. At the same time, political brands grow in importance in times of crisis, both because they offer exemplary models and because they synthesize the mythological elements of the imaginary of abundance, trust and authentic dialogue. (shrink)

Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...) or so, the infant is aware of a person attending. The attending, I propose, is experienced by the infant as having an implicit target, a focal center. In the infant’s awareness, the carer’s focal center is the self. When a You is perceived as attending, a self is apperceived. I argue that such dependence on a You’s attending continues lifelong in derivative forms. I explore the idea that original time is a partial oscillation of awareness between the perceived You and the apperceived self. I then show how, from this oscillation, the ordinary experience of time is derived. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Beginning with the situated character of the question concerning the human, this paper argues that the problem of the human is itself inextricably bound to the problem of situation or place. Consequently, any genuine philosophical anthropology must take the form of a philosophical topology. This line of argument is developed through the work Abraham Heschel, Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber, and also Helmut Plessner.

The ontological foundation of the modern world view based on irreconcilable dichotomies has held hegemonic status since the dawn of the scientific revolution. The post‐modern critique has exposed the inadequacies of the modern perspective and challenged the potential for any narrative to adequately ground a vision for the future. This paper proposes that the philosophy of Beatrice Bruteau can support a foundation for a visionary world view consistent with nursing's respect for human dignity and societal health. The author discusses the (...) key concepts of Bruteau's perspective on societal evolution based on an integrated study of science, mathematics, religion, and philosophy. This perspective is discussed as a foundation to move beyond the dichotomous influence of the modern world view and the deconstructive critique of the post‐modern perspective. The author suggests spiritual evolution and a participatory consciousness as an ontological foundation for a cosmology congruent with nursing's social mandate. (shrink)

This paper traces the changing status of the school as a counter culture in the anthropological and historical literature, in particular from the moment when compulsory mass schooling assumed the function of ideological state apparatus in the post-revolutionary 19th century West. It then focuses attention on what may be called the New School, which could be said to represent an evolved, postmodern embodiment of the social archetype of the school as interruption of the status quo. It emerged in the form (...) of schools initially associated with Romanticism and with socialist libertarian or ‘anarchist’ impulses, and moved, if temporarily, into the educational mainstream in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the left sector of the Progressive Education movement, proliferated in the 1960s and 70s in various school reform movements, and is a constant presence today in the theory and practice of those schools that identify themselves as ‘democratic’. It is based on principles of adult–child dialogue and direct democratic practice. Examples that we have of the New School tend to be characterised by material and activity environments that value variety, emergence, choice, emotional safety, self-initiation and self-organisation; that are multi-sensorial and polysymbolic; and that are organised on the principles associated with mastery learning, social learning theory and play theory—that is, moderate complexity and optimal cognitive arousal as exemplary conditions for learning. (shrink)

In this article, I embark on an analysis of Søren Kierkegaard's view of human otherness in strict correlation to his Christian philosophy. More specifically, my aim is to show that Kierkegaard's thought is essentially informed by a decisive appropriation of the soteriological category of sin which has momentous implications for Kierkegaard's views of selfhood and intersubjectivity. The main argument is that both Kierkegaard's negative evaluation of human otherness and his acerbic indictments of any collectivist interference in salvific matters cohere with (...) his appropriation of the doctrine of the Fall. At the same time, I show in what sense Kierkegaard deems human alterity to be indispensable to one's spiritual self-becoming expressed through the Christian imperative of loving the other as neighbor. Seen thus, agape, while supplementing Kierkegaard's creationistic psychology, actually becomes the necessary restorative opposite of sinfulness in the self's encounters with the distinct uniqueness of the human other. (shrink)