So-called ‘gain-of-function’ (GOF) research is virological research that results in a virus substantially more virulent or transmissible than its wild antecedent. GOF research has been subject to ethical analysis in the past, but the methods of GOF research have to date been underexamined by philosophers in these analyses. Here, we examine the typical animal used in influenza GOF experiments, the ferret, and show how despite its longstanding use, it does not easily satisfy the desirable criteria for ananimal model. We then (...) discuss the limitations of the ferret model, and how those epistemic limitations bear on ethical and policy questions around the risks and benefits of GOF research. We conclude with a reflection on how philosophy of science can contribute to ethical and policy debates around the risks, benefits and relative priority of life sciences research. (shrink)

Debates about dual-use research often turn on the potential for scientific research to be used to benefit or harm humanity. This dual-use potential is conventionally understood as the product of the magnitude of the harms and benefits of dual-use research, multiplied by their likelihood. This account, however, neglects important social aspects of the use of science and technology. In this paper, I supplement existing conceptions of dual-use potential to account for the social context of dual-use research. This account incorporates relational (...) and positional concerns that feature in the success or failure of dual-use. I then defend this account against foreseeable objections. (shrink)

In 2010, President Obama instructed the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues to enquire into research carried out by the US Public Health Service in Guatemala between 1946 and 1948. These studies entailed the deliberate inoculation of unconsenting prisoners, mental asylum patients and soldiers, with venereal disease. There was also evidence of deception and secrecy. The Commission’s report describes the research as heinous, egregious, unconscionable and unjustifiable, and identified those responsible as morally blameworthy. However, this article argues that (...) the Commission was deficient in its historical analysis, and failed to appreciate particular disease and temporal factors that might cast the research in a slightly different light. This is not to exculpate the researchers, but rather to critique the Commission’s analysis. The straightforward narrative woven by the Commission does not accurately reflect the muddy ethical waters of the time, nor the utilitarian ethos that pervaded particular research agendas. The creation of a facile story denies to us a proper understanding of why events unfolded as they did, and as a consequence a potential lack of comprehension of those elements that might prevent unethical and harmful research practices from being conducted in the future. (shrink)

Scientific research that could cause grave harm, either through accident or intentional malevolence, is known as dual-use research. Recent high-profile cases of dual-use research in the life sciences have led to debate about the extent to which restrictions on the conduct and dissemination of such research may impede scientific progress. We adapt formal models of scientific networks to systematically explore the effects that different regulatory schemes may have on a community’s ability to learn about the world. Our results suggest that, (...) contrary to common wisdom, some restrictions on the conduct and dissemination of dual-use research do not inhibit scientific progress and may actually aid communities in learning. (shrink)

Dual Use Research of Concern constitutes a major challenge for research practice and oversight on the local, national and international level. The situation in Germany is shaped by two partly competing suggestions of how to regulate security-related research: The German Ethics Council, as an independent political advisory body, recommended a series of measures, including national legislation on DURC. Competing with that, the German National Academy of Sciences and the German Research Foundation, as two major professional bodies, presented a strategy which (...) draws on the self-control of science and, inter alia, suggests expanding the scope of research ethics committees to an evaluation of DURC. This situation is taken as an occasion to further discuss the scope and limits of professional self-control with respect to security-related research. The role of RECs as professional bodies of science is particularly analyzed, referring to the theoretical backgrounds of professionalism. Two key sociological features of professionalism – ethical orientation and professional self-control – are discussed with respect to the practice of biomedical science. Both attributes are then analyzed with respect to the assessment of DURC by RECs. In conclusion, it is stated that issues of biosecurity transcend the boundaries of the scientific community and that a more comprehensive strategy should be implemented encompassing both professional self-control and legal oversight. (shrink)