Louis Loeb has argued that Hume is pessimistic while Peirce is optimistic about the attainment of fully stable beliefs. In contrast, we argue that Hume was optimistic about such attainment but only if the scope of philosophical investigation is limited to first-order explanatory questions. Further, we argue that Peirce, after reformulating the pragmatic maxim to accommodate the reality of counterfactuals, was pessimistic about such attainment. Finally, we articulate and respond to Peirce's objection that Hume's skeptical arguments in T 1.4.1 and (...) his commitment to common sense indicate that Hume was confused about whether we could have stable beliefs at all. (shrink)

Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified by a unitary (...) set of evidentiary rules. I argue that James did build a unitary epistemology but not by loosening cognitive standards. In his psychological research, he had adopted the Comtian view that hypotheses and regulative assumptions play a crucial role in the context of discovery even though they must be provisionally adopted before they can be supported by evidence. “The Will to Believe” relies on this methodological point to achieve a therapeutic goal—to convince despairing Victorians that religious faith can be reconciled with a scientific epistemology. James argues that the prospective theist is in the same epistemic situation with respect to the “religious hypothesis” as the scientist working in the context of discovery. (shrink)

The essay compares Peirce's pragmatist approach to the problem of perceptual experience as a fallible foundation of knowledge to a sophisticated empiricist take on the issue. The comparison suggests that, while empiricism can accommodate the idea of perception as fallible, theoretically laden, and containing conjectural elements, the cardinal difference between pragmatism and empiricism consists in the pragmatist insistence on the intrinsic intelligibility of experience, which also serves as the ultimate source of all forms of intelligibility; whereas empiricism retains a penchant (...) for fitting experiences into abstract conceptual schemes. (shrink)

Between World War I and World War II, the students of Columbia University's John Dewey and Frederick J. E. Woodbridge built up a school of philosophical naturalism sharply critical of claims to value-neutrality. In the 1930s and 1940s, the second-generation Columbia naturalists and their students who later joined the department reacted with dismay to the arrival on American shores of logical empiricism and other analytic modes of philosophy. These figures undermined their colleague Ernest Nagel's attempt to build an alliance with (...) the logical empiricists, accusing them of ignoring the scholar's primary role as a public critic. After the war, the prestige of analytic approaches and a tendency to label philosophies either???analytic??? or???Continental??? eclipsed the Columbia philosophers??? normatively inflected naturalism. Yet in their efforts to resist logical empiricism, the Columbia naturalists helped to construct a sturdy, canonical portrait of???American philosophy??? that proponents still hold up as a third way between analytic and Continental approaches. (shrink)

Este artículo rastrea la presencia del realismo, el empirismo y el sinequismo en las teorías de la cognición de Aristóteles y de Charles S. Peirce. Los dos primeros términos se relacionan comúnmente con ambos autores, pero aquí se quiere precisar en detalle qué semejanzas y diferencias hay entre el realismo y el empirismo de estos dos filósofos. De otro lado, el sinequismo se relaciona solo con Peirce, mientras que a Aristóteles se le ubica precisamente como opositor a cualquier idea de (...) continuidad e infinito. Lo que se quiere mostrar aquí es que, al menos en el ámbito de la cognición, Aristóteles es también un sinequista. Otro punto importante del artículo es que intenta criticar y corregir la interpretación que hace Peirce del empirismo de Aristóteles al intentar erróneamente de afirmar que el filósofo griego es un intuicionista. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende tecer algumas breves considerações acerca de um importante e heurístico tema da filosofia arquitetônica de Charles Sanders Peirce, a saber, o papel exercido pelo conceito de jogo estético do devaneio no surgimento e estabelecimento de uma crença pragmática na hipótese da realidade de Deus. Seguindo, dentro do limite de espaço disponível, a exposição das etapas do chamado argumento negligenciado para a realidade de Deus, desenvolvido por Peirce em texto homônimo, mostrar-se-á como o conceito de jogo estético (...) do devaneio encontra-se profundamente alicerçado na ontologia realística do autor e como esse conceito, embora apareça, propriamente falando, como a primeira etapa de um processo de pensamento sobre traços notáveis do universo real, um estado mental livre e despropositado, que não se propõe a mediar algo, tal como o pensamento autocontrolado o faz, mas que pode, no entanto, resultar no sentimento de estar diante de alguma maravilha em um dos três universos da experiência, acaba por converter-se, em última instância, em um processo de ponderação com força de apelo instintivo para a conduta da vida, sendo essa, justamente, a sua marcante e contundente significação pragmática. (shrink)

The first part of this essay provides an analysis of the text “The Law of Mind”, in which Peirce theorizes about the power of growth and spreading of ideas and also presents his response to the classic question about how mind can influence matter. We intended to show, from an analysis focused on the dual semantic meaning of the word “ affect ”, how the author’s rupture with the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter implies in a substantial identity between (...) ideality and reality by means of a metaphysical merging of realism and idealism, where matter is taken to be only a special case of mind . The second part shows how the forms of evolutionism are drawn from the three categories, highlighting the agapism, the doctrine of cosmic and creative love. Finally, we shall argue on how the association between realism and idealism, as well as the considerations of the author’s evolutionism, constitute vital aspects for the justification of the historical success of our human capacity for conjecturing, viz., for proposing successful hypothesis to explain the facts. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce, polymath, philosopher, logician, lived a life of often wild extremes and, when he died in 1914, had earned a vile reputation as a debauched genius. Yet he created a unified, profound and brilliant work, both published and unpublished, a fact difficult to explain. In my 1993 biography, I proposed three hypotheses to account for his Jekyll-Hyde character: his obsession with the puzzle of meaning, two neurological pathologies, trigeminal neuralgia and left-handedness, and the powerful influence of his father. (...) After publication, further research has led me to propose two additional hypotheses to explain his extraordinary life: manic-depressive illness and mystical experience, the last greatly influencing the development of his doctrine of semeiotic, of which his logic of science is a part. (shrink)

One of the least explored areas of C.S. Peirce's wide range of work is his contributions to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This dissertation examines the corpus of this work, especially as it relates to the subjects of mind, habit, instinct, sentiment, emotion, perception, consciousness, cognition, and community. The argument is that Peirce's contributions to these areas of investigation were both highly original and heavily influenced by the main intellectual currents of his time. An effort has been made to (...) present Peirce's philosophy without apology, within the conceptual framework and idiom of its time, and without appeal to a comprehensive view that Peirce never articulated. Nevertheless, as several noted interpreters have argued, much of this work can be viewed through the lens of Peirce's innovative theory of signs and the notion of the semiotic triad as its central unifying feature, despite the fact that the general theory was itself under continuous refinement and remained incomplete at the time of his death. Another hermeneutical device employed is William James' better known and more accessible work which, when juxtaposed with Peirce's ideas, serves to bring them into sharper relief. While general and historical in the presentation of material, this study seeks, at the same time, to engage the criticism of contemporary Peirce scholars in an attempt to account for several of the conundrums inherent in Peirce's work. Among the problems with implications for his philosophy of mind and theory of inquiry are the limitations of his theory of continuity, his negative view of the self, his somewhat ambiguous position on the relation of psychology to logic, and the metaethical puzzle arising from application of his theory of probable inference to truly fateful decisions. These problems provide an interesting perspective and lend balance to the truly insightful contributions Peirce made to the discovery of the mind. (shrink)