One of the few things modern liberals, classical liberals, and conservatives can agree on is the charge that some of the worst features oftotalitarian socialist regimes have their origins in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Nevertheless, the nature of this claim, and therefore the reasons for accepting or rejecting it, are oftenleft obscure. If it is understood simply as a causal statement, then it must be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical social science. The political philosopher can at (...) most assist by providing a clear characterization of the conceptual content of the beliefs which constitute the independent variable in the alleged causal relation: those beliefs concerning Marx's and Engels's thoughts which are said to have exerted the causal influence in question. Even if empirical research did showthat beliefs about Marxist theory were a significant causal influencein the rise of certain features of totalitarian socialism, this wouldbe of limited philosophical interest if the beliefs in question were misunderstandings of the theory and if the correct explanationof why these misunderstandings occurred appealed to factors external to the theory itself. However, it would be of considerable philosophical interest if correct beliefs about Marxist theory exerted a causalinfluence on some of the more undesirable aspects of totalitarian socialism, or if incorrect beliefs did and the existence of thesemisunderstandings could be traced to ambiguities or gaps in the Marxist theory itself. The political philosopher has a legitimate interestin the relationship between the writings of Marx and Engels on the rise of totalitarian socialism, not because he is interested in articulating and testing causal connections between beliefs and social phenomena in general, but because Marxist theory is supposed – by its authors – to inspire and guide change toward a better society. (shrink)

During the last years Anglosaxon discussion about Marx and Marxism has been characterized by an intensified interest in historical materialism as a general theory of history. The most extensive, careful and analytically rigorous among several new treatments is the one by G.A. Cohen, which is the subject of four critical articles in the present issue of Analyse & Kritik. To make these articles and Cohen’s project understandable to the German reader, an attempt is made in the following to summarize the (...) main arguments of Cohen’s defence of historical materialism and of the ensuing comprehensive and detailed discussion. (shrink)

No. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol.26 (2) 2007:228-238.

Theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Nozick have argued that citizens can gain insight into the demands of justice by experimenting with diverse forms of political life. I consider the rationa...

John Roemer once described the ‘intellectual foundations’ of analytical Marxism as the recognition that, despite having a valid core, Marxism rested upon outdated social science. The solution, he believed, was to update the theory ‘using state-of-the-art methods of analytical philosophy and “positivist” social science’. If one takes this definition literally, Jürgen Habermas’ early work qualifies as that of an analytical Marxist. Yet although he developed his project in a way that was independent of the self-identified analytical Marxists, there are important (...) points of convergence in their views. In particular, in their efforts to update Marxism, both Habermas and the analytical Marxists managed to talk themselves out of being Marxists in any recognizable sense of the term. This is a noteworthy outcome, given the differences in their points of departure. This article tracks the intellectual history of these two movements, in order to identify the tendencies that pushed this rather disparate group of theorists in the same direction. (shrink)