دیدگاه کریستین وُلف دربارۀ ‌‌ادراک حسی که چارچوبی لایب‌‌‌نیتسی دارد، اساس استتیک او را برمی‌‌‌سازد. او با توجه به ماهیت واضح ولی مغشوشِ ‌‌ادراک حسی در این چارچوب، مفهوم کمال و لذت را تبیین می‌‌‌کند و از همین معبر ره به تعریف زیبایی می‌‌‌برد. به این ترتیب، از نظر او، کمال همانا توافق یا هماهنگی کثرات یا انبوهی از اشیاء یا اجزای آن‌هاست؛ لذت، حاصل شهود کمال در اشیاء است؛ و زیبایی هم عبارت است از کمال شیْ‏ء از آن حیث (...) که برای ایجاد لذت در ما مناسب است. با این اوصاف، در این مقاله قصد داریم ماهیت ‌‌ادراک حسی نزد او و رابطۀ ادراک حسی، کمال و لذت را با زیبایی در استتیک او بکاویم تا مشخص شود چگونه علم استتیک به‌‌‌طور عام از دل مباحث معرفت‌‌‌شناختی و به‌‌‌طور خاص از بطن ‌‌ادراک حسی بیرون می‌‌‌آید. در نهایت‌‌، با در نظر داشتن این مهم که خود او مستقیماً داعیۀ نظریۀ مستقلی در حوزۀ استتیک نداشته، نقد و نظری بر لوازم مربوط به استتیک او خواهیم داشت تا حدود و ثغور نظریۀ عقل‌‌‌گرایانۀ مفرط او در برخورد با مسائلی چون دایرۀ شمول زیبایی، مراتب زیبایی و اختلاف‌‌‌نظرهای ذوقی مشخص شود. (shrink)

I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.

Introduction to the special issue, "The Birth of the Discipline", guest edited by Endre Szécsényi with Rob van Gerwen, of Aesthetic Investigations.

Nietzsche consistently valorizes artistic falsehoods. On standard interpretations, this is because art provides deceptive yet salutary fictions that help us affirm life. This reading conflicts, however, with Nietzsche’s insistence that life-affirmation requires untrammeled honesty. I present an alternative interpretation which navigates the interpretive impasse. With special attention to the influence of Friedrich Schiller, the paper argues for three claims: (1) Nietzsche does not hold that art is false because it “beautifies,” but because it produces mere semblances of, its objects; (2) (...) these semblances are essentially non-deceptive; (3) he values artistic illusions because they dispose us positively to illusion more generally. Such ‘evaluative reorientation,’ I argue, is not merely consistent with, but integral to, achieving Nietzsche’s ideal of honesty. (shrink)

In this essay, I investigate Baumgarten’s doctrine of the six perfections of knowledge (wealth, magnitude, truth, clarity, certainty, and life), which is famously one of the most characteristic and enigmatic features of his philosophy. Recent scholarship has almost unanimously stressed the rhetorical background of the categories. Instead, I argue that Baumgarten elaborates his theory in close relationship with coeval philosophy. To support this claim, I examine the position of some Thomasian philosophers, such as Johann Liborius Zimmermann, who had indicated a (...) list of criteria similar to that of Baumgarten. Moreover, I analyse the distinction between formal and material perfections, tracing it back to the Wolffian milieu. On these bases, I propose a new reconstruction of Baumgarten’s doctrine, with particular attention to its aesthetic application. Finally, I outline the reception of the six categories in the late German Enlightenment until Kant. (shrink)

Central issues in philosophy of architecture include foundational matters regarding the nature of: (1) architecture as an artform, design medium, or other product or practice; (2) architectural objects—what sorts of things they are; how they differ from other sorts of objects; and how we define the range of such objects; (3) special architectural properties, like the standard trio of structural integrity (firmitas), beauty, and utility—or space, light, and form; and ways they might be special to architecture; (4) architectural types—how to (...) consider abstract groups of architectural objects and their instances; (5) meaning and other language-like phenomena in architecture and its objects; (6) formation of and warrant for our basic grasp, and considered judgment, of architectural objects; and (7) social and moral features of architectural objects and architectural practice. Yet other questions engage applied philosophical concerns regarding architecture, such as the character of architectural notation; intellectual property rights; and client-architect obligations. A far-reaching philosophy of architecture extends beyond even a broadly aesthetics-based assessment, to include considerations of ethics, social and political philosophy, and philosophical reflections on psychology and the behavioral sciences. The aesthetics of architecture, by itself, spans traditional issues mooted in philosophy of art, as well as aesthetics of the everyday, and environmental aesthetics. Such traditional issues include the nature of the work; the possibility of classes, kinds, or types in the domain; the character and roles of representation, intentionality, and expression; and the warranted foundations for criticism. The ethics of architecture also addresses traditional issues, including delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in architectural milieus. Still other aspects of philosophy of architecture concern social and technological characteristics. (shrink)

Leibniz’s account of perception for understanding of German rationalistic aesthetic tradition in 18 century is very crucial and important. His account of sense qualities has a Cartesian framework and it is so central to his views on aesthetic experience. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure based on the clear but confused nature of perception. Accordingly, he defines beauty as follows: perfection is the ability or power to unite multiple properties into one; pleasure is feeling perfection in things. Beauty, (...) for him, is the contemplation or reflection upon the pleasurable, or perfection of things. Having investigated the importance of Leibniz in German aesthetics, we intend to figure out the nature of perfection and its relationship to aesthetic experience, perfection, and beauty in his aesthetics. (shrink)

Christian Wolff’s view regarding sensory perception – which is formed on a Leibnizian framework – forms the base of his aesthetics. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure according to the clear but disordered essence of sensory perception that is present in this framework and through this very path guides towards the definition of beauty. Thus, according to him, perfection is the consistency or accordance of diversity or the abundance of things or their parts; pleasure is the result of (...) the intuition of the perfection present in things; and beauty is the perfection of a thing from the aspect of it being suitable in creating pleasure in us. Therefore, in this article we intend to explore the essence of sensory perception according to him and the relation between it, perfection and pleasure with beauty in his aesthetics so that it becomes clear how aesthetics emerges from the heart of epistemological discussions in general and from the depths of sensory perception in particular. Finally, while keeping in mind the important fact that he did not directly claim to have an independent theory in the field of aesthetics, we will critique and give our views in regards to the requisites connected to his aesthetics so that the limits of his extreme rationalist views in dealing with issues such as the extent that beauty covers, the levels of beauty and the difference of views in relation to taste and liking become clear. (shrink)