The goal of this article is to answer some of the criticisms of my views on social science formulated by contributors to the symposium on my philosophy of social science. Key Words: emergence • mechanism • method • process • understanding.

Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about (...) their experience and beliefs (Chapman 1991; 1999). It is through such triadic interaction that children gradually construct knowledge of the world as well as knowledge of other people. We contend that the extent and nature of the social interaction children experience will influence the development of children's social understanding. Increased opportunity to engage in cooperative social interaction and exposure to talk about mental states should facilitate the development of social understanding. We review evidence suggesting that children's understanding of mind develops gradually in the context of social interaction. Therefore, we need a theory of development in this area that accords a fundamental role to social interaction, yet does not assume that children simply adopt socially available knowledge but rather that children construct an understanding of mind within social interaction. Key Words: language; Piaget; social interaction; theories of mind; Vygotsky; Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This article discusses relations among the multiple levels of analysis present in macro-sociological explanation—i.e., relations of individual, structural, and institutional processes. It also criticizes the doctrinal insistence upon single-level individualistic explanation found in some prominent contemporary sociological theory. For illustrative material the article returns to intellectual uses of Weber's "Protestant Ethic thesis," showing how an artificial version has been employed as a kind of proof text for the alleged scientific necessity of individualist explanation. Our alternative exposition renders the discussion of (...) Protestantism and capitalism in an explicitly multilevel way, distinguishing possible individual-level, social-organizational, and institutional linkages. The causal processes involved are distinct ones, with the more structural and institutional forms neither captured nor attainable by individual-level thinking. We argue more generally that "methodological individualisms" confuse issues of explanation with issues about microfoundations. This persistent intellectual conflation may be rooted in the broader folk models of liberal individualism. (shrink)

[Opening paragraph:] Ontological realism or holism about social groups is the thesis that groups are composite material particulars. Social groups are entities over which we quantify in the set of our best descriptions and explanations of the social world. The realist explains that a group considered in its own right can be causally responsible for the production of events or states of affairs. We do more than just describe and furnish explanations of the phenomena of the social world. In our (...) ordinary discourse and in the arenas of policy formation, legislation and the administration of laws we make moral judgments of groups and seek to direct action toward them. Granted realism about groups the concern of the present paper is the sense in or extent to which we can talk literally of a group as such being morally responsible, and, in particular, of whether it is apt to make responsibility judgments of large groups such as nations. That is, whether a group considered as an entity in its own right can be the appropriate bearer of the full-blown ascription of moral responsibility. For when we talk of individuals being collectively responsible we seem to just pick out as the responsible party them as a group—the individual members regarded jointly or collectively as one unit. (shrink)

Taking ontological realism about social groups as the thesis that groups are composite material objects constituted by their members, this paper considers a challenge to the very possibility that groups be regarded as material entities. Ordinarily we believe that two groups can have synchronic co-extensive memberships—for example, the choir and the rugby team—while preserving their distinctive identity conditions. We also doubt that two objects of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time, which would appear (...) to be the case when groups have identical memberships. I explain that the principle denying the synchronic co-location of objects of the same kind need not apply universally to material objects and that it is a mistake to take resistance to penetrability as a necessary feature of materiality. Therefore, initial appearances notwithstanding, groups can be in the same place at the same time. Key Words: identity • materiality • location • social group. (shrink)

The notion of responsibility seeks to establish a connection between agents and some harm or injustice, imposing on them the duty to make things right. The identification of responsibilities is therefore a fundamental step in the work of fighting against injustices, by imposing concrete obligations on particular agents. However, our globalizing world puts in crisis the traditional assumptions on which this idea is based. In this article I examine the reasons for this crisis and I offer alternative interpretations to avoid (...) the problems identified. I argue in favour of adopting a structural perspective that leaves aside the interactional point of view of ethics. (shrink)

This comprehensive review explores the evolving epistemological foundations of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), tracing its transition from a practical, applied field to a scientific discipline. The paper critically examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie prominent HRA models, emphasizing their impact on both scientific validity and practical application. Organized into five sections, the paper begins by articulating its primary aim in Section 1: to uncover and scrutinize the philosophical assumptions within HRA models. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 delve into reductionist and holistic (...) paradigms. Section 2.4 focuses on the shift toward holistic theories, emphasizing the integration of human, technical, and organizational elements in modern socio-technical systems. Section 3 concludes by examining systemic approaches, capturing the paradigm shift from reductionism to a broader, interdependent view of accidents and reliability. Section 4 sheds light on the contemporary HRA models, emphasizing the prevalence of systemism in recent research. Notable models, such as SoTeRiA and FRAM, undergo scrutiny for their systemic approach, revealing interrelationships crucial for understanding accidents in complex operations. In Section 5, the paper explores the practical implications of the epistemological insights gained, emphasizing their potential impact on the development and enhancement of HRA models. The conclusion advocates for a paradigm shift in HRA that involves rethinking the epistemological bases of models. It underscores the need for ongoing philosophical scrutiny to drive the discipline's progress, ultimately enhancing our understanding, prediction, and improvement of human performance and system safety. (shrink)