The reflections recorded in this paper arise from three moments in the theory of definition and of conceptual analysis. The moments are: Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, the discussion there of the paradox of analysis, and the division that Frege marks, ensuing upon his distinction of Sinn/sense from Bedeutung/reference, between two different conceptions of definition; Leibniz’s still serviceable account of a distinction between the clarity and the distinctness of ideas---a distinction that prompts the suggestion that the guiding purpose (...) of lexical definition is Leibnizian clarity whereas that of real definition is inseparable from the pursuit of Leibnizian distinctness; Leibniz’s speculations concerning the limit or terminus of analysis. The apparent failure of these speculations, casting doubt as it does upon the aspirations that give rise to them, points to the long-standing need to reconfigure the philosophical business of enquiry into concepts. (shrink)

If the Aristotelian division has above all an epistemic and heuristic purpose, this article aims to examine the ontological appropriation of division by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, too often neglected by secondary literature. Division is also an ontological operation, insofar it governs the relationship between the eidos (which is identified, in the context of the central books of the Metaphysics, with the primary substance, i.e. what is properly speaking), its genus and the final differentia of this genus. More precisely, we (...) will show that division is a case of the hylemorphic relation: the genus is an (intelligible) matter to which the final differentia obtained by division is predicated, and which then acts as the formal cause of this genus being such a determined eidos. However, this ontological and hylemorphic dimension of Aristotelian division is largely compatible with its methodological use. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of ‘reasonable’ argumentation in Generation of Animals III.10. Its aim is to develop an alternative to the dialectical construal of reasonable argumentation in Aristotle recently favoured by Robert Bolton. On the basis of a close textual analysis I show that the reasonable arguments deployed in Generation of Animals III.10 do not appeal to endoxa or reputable beliefs per se. Instead, they rely upon general facts about animals established by empirical induction. This implies that, contra Bolton, (...) not all reasonable arguments in Aristotle are dialectical; some, in fact, are thoroughly empirical and scientific. I conclude by suggesting that such empirical reasonable arguments even have a place in the De Caelo, the treatise that Bolton primarily focused upon when developing his interpretation. (shrink)

The place of matter in the definition of the sensible substance evolves over the course of Metaphysics books Z and H : whereas chapters 10 and 11 of book Z claim that matter must be excluded from the definiens of the sensible substance, chapter 2 of book H claims that it must include it. The present article will show that this difference in doctrine comes from a refinement of the way in which the causal priority of form is expressed in (...) the definition. First, in book Z, it is expressed by a reduction of the terms of the definiens to « parts of the form » only, a reduction which is immediately considered superfluous and unsatisfactory. In book H then, it will be by the position it occupies as a predicate of the matter that is precisely meant to express this priority. In this sense, the two sets of texts do not constitute a theoretic volte-face from Aristotle, but the refinement of a single model of definition expressing the priority of form. (shrink)