On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

The medicalization of risk rests on foundational assumptions shared by economics and public health. Economists, however, think in terms of pursuing an array of goods, and hence, they offer useful critiques of the irrationality involved in trying to subordinate all goods to one narrow good, like avoiding death from a particular disease. Many of our approaches to health do not appear to be fully rational, suggesting that the deeper motivation lying behind our concerns about health are to be found in (...) something other than the impulse to extend human lives as much as possible. This paper draws on the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas to sketch a richer way of thinking about the goods we pursue in health care that can help us to avoid the pitfalls associated with the medicalization of risk. (shrink)