_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, who constitutes an (...) important representative of Advaita thought, points out that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject. I argue that at the level of the One, similar to the state of _ātman_ consciousness in Advaita framework, the soul experiences itself in expansive non-dual consciousness. Lastly, I examine the role of non-duality as the foundation of knowledge. (shrink)

I use Plotinus to present absolute divine simplicity as the consequence of principles about metaphysical and explanatory priority to which most theists are already committed. I employ Phil Corkum’s account of ontological independence as independent status to present a new interpretation of Plotinus on the dependence of everything on the One. On this reading, if something else (whether an internal part or something external) makes you what you are, then you are ontologically dependent on it. I show that this account (...) supports Plotinus’s claim that any entity with parts cannot be fully independent. In particular, I lay out Plotinus’s case for thinking that even a divine self-understanding intellect cannot be fully independent. I then argue that a weaker version of simplicity is not enough for the theist since priority monism meets the conditions of a moderate version of ontological independence just as well as a transcendent but complex ultimate being. (shrink)

The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads.

_The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads._.

This article explores the continuities and discontinuities of pre-Revolutionary intellectual traditions in 1920s Soviet culture and the Stalin-era cultural revolution. Through examination of the pre-revolutionary philosophical legacy underpinning Soviet musicological theory, I demonstrate that there are decisive features, such asSoviet Prometheanism, that characterize the musicology of the 1920s that both underline and differ from the pre-revolutionary philosophy of music and the musicology of the 1930s. I offer the basic outlines of aSoviet cultural theory of musicformulated by Russian music critic, historian, (...) composer and musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949) in the 1920s. Explaining and describing what I mean by a particular cultural theory of music in the Soviet context forms the core issue of my article. (shrink)

Happiness ) materializes as the ultimate goal of man in Abū NaṣrMuḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Tarkhān al-Fārābīs Mabādi' Arā' Ahl Al-Madīna Al-Fāḍila. Buthappiness, i.e., happiness in this life and happiness in the afterlife, is onlyattainable by the virtuous citizen. The prevailing academic vision of Fārābī'sVirtuous City essentially can be placed into two categories: either it is an idealas found in Plato’s Republic or it is an actual city that has been founded or willbe established at some time in the future. (...) The difficulty with both of theseinterpretations is that they limit who can attain happiness. (shrink)

Several commentators make the claim that Augustine is not a systematic thinker. The purpose of this thesis is to refute that claim in one specific area of Augustine's thought, the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to the problem of evil. Through an exegetical examination of various works in which Augustine writes on evil, I show that his solutions for both natural and moral evil rely on a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a Platonically influenced Christian context.

Plotinus calls the first principle the One and the Good. According to Plotinus, ‘Good’ is an appropriate name for the One because the One is that which all things desire. Since he says that the One is beyond knowledge, beyond language, beyond intellect, and beyond being, however, what philosophical evidence can he provide for his claim that the One is that which all desire? In this article I offer some philosophical evidence, aside from mystical union with the One, for why (...) ‘the Good’ is an appropriate name for the One, and for why calling the One ‘Good’ is not at odds with the fact that it is beyond knowledge, but rather entails it. To this end, after an initial consideration of the relationship between the good and desire in Plato and Aristotle, I focus on the role that desire plays in relation to the Good in Plotinus’ thought. (shrink)

Plótínovo filosofické dílo je mimořádně systematické, nicméně jeho značný rozsah a složitost znesnadňuje celkové pochopení a výklad. V předkládané studii se pokoušíme prozkoumat základní strukturu celé Plótínovy metafyzické stavby, v souladu s nejnovějšími interpretačními poznatky. Východiskem je hierarchické uspořádání celého systému, přičemž ve výkladu postupujeme po metafyzických úrovních a snažíme se charakterizovat jak jejich vlastní povahu, tak vztah k ostatním součástem Plótínova systému.