In previous works we have established that the spacetime probabilistic organization of the quantum theory is determined by the spacetime characteristics of the operations by which the observer produces the objects to be studied (“states” of microsystems) and obtains qualifications of these. Guided by this first conclusion, we have then built a “general syntax of relativized conceptualization” where any description is explicitly and systematically referred to the two basic epistemic operations by which the conceptor introduces the object to be qualified (...) and then obtains qualifications of it. Inside this syntax there emerges a general typology of the relativized descriptions. Here we show that with respect to this typology the type of the predictive quantum mechanical descriptions acquires a precise definition. It appears that the quantum mechanical formalism has captured and has expressed directly in a mathematical language the most complex form in which can occur a first descriptional phase that lies universally at the bottom of any chain of conceptualization. The main features of the Hilbert-Dirac algorithms are decoded in terms of the general syntax of relativized conceptualization. This renders explicit the semantical contents of the quantum mechanical representations relating each one of these to its mathematical quantum mechanical expression. Basic insufficiencies are thus identified and, correlatively, false problems as well as answers to these, or guides toward answers. Globally the results obtained provide a basis for future attempts at a general mathematical representation of the processes of conceptualization. “Il pourrait, en effet, être dangereux pour l'avenir de la Physique qu'elle se contente trop facilement de purs formalismes, d'images floues et d'explications toutes verbales s'exprimant par des mots à signification imprécise”—Louis de Broglie,Certitudes et Incertitudes de la Science (Albin Michel, Paris, 1965). (shrink)

An SR model is presented that shows how an objective (noncontextual and local) interpretation of quantum mechanics can be constructed, which contradicts some well-established beliefs following from the standard interpretation of the theory and from known no-go theorems. The SR model is not a hidden variables theory in the standard sense, but it can be considered a hidden parameters theory which satisfies constraints that are weaker than those usually imposed on standard hidden variables theories. The SR model is also extended (...) in a natural way that shows how a broader theory embodying quantum mechanics can be envisaged which is realistic in a semantic sense, hence compatible with various “realistic” perspectives. (shrink)

Nonobjectivity of physical properties enters physics with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), and a number of paradoxes of this theory follow from it. It seems, however, based on sound physical arguments (double slit experiment, Heisenberg's principle, Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem, etc.), so that most physicists think that avoiding it is impossible. We discuss these arguments here and show that they can be criticized from a physical viewpoint. Our criticism proves that nonobjectivity must be considered an epistemological choice rather than an (...) unavoidable feature of QM, so that an objective interpretation of QM is not a priori impossible, which justifies our attempt at providing it in some previous papers. This interpretation is based on a classical language in which the language of the standard interpretation (Quantum Logic) is embedded as a subset of statements that are directly testable according to QM. (shrink)

The weak objectification of physical properties is shown to yield the same probabilistic implications as strong objectification and can therefore be refuted on the basis of suitable interference experiments. An alternative test of hypothetical objectification statements, as they occur in the EPR experiment, is based on joint probabilities and the ensuing Bell inequalities. Quantum mechanics turns out to be partially compatible with Bell's inequalities even in cases where weak objectification is excluded by interference.

Scientific knowledge should not only be true, it should be as objective as possible. It should refer to a reality independent of any subject. What can we use as a criterion of objectivity? Intersubjectivity (i.e., intersubjective understandability and intersubjective testability) is necessary, but not sufficient. Other criteria are: independence of reference system, independence of method, non-conventionality. Is there some common trait? Yes, there is: invariance under some specified transformations. Thus, we say: A proposition is objective only if its truth is (...) invariant against a change in the conditions under which it was formulated. We give illustrations from geometry, perception, neurobiology, relativity theory, and quantum theory. Such an objectivist position has many advantages. (shrink)