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  1. Reconciling Spacetime and the Quantum: Relational Blockworld and the Quantum Liar Paradox. [REVIEW]William Mark Stuckey, Michael Silbserstein & Michael Cifone - 2008 - Foundations of Physics 38 (4):348-383.
    The Relational Blockworld (RBW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) is introduced. Accordingly, the spacetime of NRQM is a relational, non-separable blockworld whereby spatial distance is only defined between interacting trans-temporal objects. RBW is shown to provide a novel statistical interpretation of the wavefunction that deflates the measurement problem, as well as a geometric account of quantum entanglement and non-separability that satisfies locality per special relativity and is free of interpretative mystery. We present RBW’s acausal and adynamical resolution of the (...)
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  • The Hidden Clash: Spacetime Outlook and Quantum-State Reductions.Rafael Andrés Alemañ-Berenguer - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (3):79.
    It is generally assumed that compatibility with special relativity is guaranteed by the invariance of the fundamental equations of quantum physics under Lorentz transformations and the impossibility of transferring energy or information faster than the speed of light. Despite this, various contradictions persist, which make us suspect the solidity of that compatibility. This paper focuses on collapse theories—although they are not the only way of interpreting quantum theory—in order to examine what seems to be insurmountable difficulties we encounter when trying (...)
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  • Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures.Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):213-235.
    Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).
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