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  1. Does Schopenhauer accept any positive pleasures?Joshua Isaac Fox - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):902-913.
    Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasure. I argue that neither way of motivating the positive pleasure reading succeeds. Both overlook a key aspect (...)
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  • Pleasure and truth inrepublic9.David Wolfsdorf - 2013 - Classical Quarterly 63 (1):110-138.
    AtRepublic9, 583b1–587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the ‘true pleasure argument’. The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1–585a7 and 585a8–587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call ‘the misperception argument’ and ‘the true filling argument’ respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor (...)
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  • Socrates And The Patients: Republic IX, 583c-585a.James Warren - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (2):113-137.
    Republic IX 583c-585a presents something surprisingly unusual in ancient accounts of pleasure and pain: an argument in favour of the view that there are three relevant hedonic states: pleasure, pain, and an intermediate. The argument turns on the proposal that a person's evaluation of their current state may be misled by a comparison with a prior or subsequent state. The argument also refers to `pure' and anticipated pleasures. The brief remarks in the Republic may appear cursory or clumsy in comparison (...)
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  • Pleasure and truth in republic 9.David Wolfsdorf - 2013 - Classical Quarterly 63 (1):110-138.
    AtRepublic9, 583b1–587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the ‘true pleasure argument’. The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1–585a7 and 585a8–587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call ‘the misperception argument’ and ‘the true filling argument’ respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor (...)
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