A distinction is made between two definitions of animal cognition: the one most frequently employed in cognitive sciences considers cognition as extracting and processing information; a more phenomenologically inspired model considers it as attributing to a form of the outside world a significance, linked to the state of the animal. The respective fields of validity of these two models are discussed along with the limitations they entail, and the questions they pose to evolutionary biologists are emphasized. This is followed by (...) a presentation of a general overview of what might be the study of the evolution of knowledge in animals. (shrink)

In ethology, and more generally in the study of animal behavior, observations are _theory-laden_. A review of theories of animal behavior reveals that the animal is a variable _object_, shaped by variable levels of causality. This approach to animal behavior, which differs radically from the way psychology studies human behavior, is a consequence of the difficulty of treating animals as _subjects_ in ethology, where they are most often studied _in the third person_. However, there is a subjectivist tradition in the (...) study of animal behavior, influenced by a phenomenological background. Our aim to promote a _at first person_ approach has led us to propose an etho-phenomenology based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Francisco Varela’s enaction theory and constructivist psychology. However, in order to legitimize this approach to animal behavior, we apply it here to behaviors that seem abnormal according to traditional explanatory frameworks, such as actospatiality, tail carrying in mice or expressing ambivalence displayed through color in octopuses. Furthermore, to explore issues such as human-animal communication, the etho-phenomenological perspective is combined with the notion of participatory sense-making, leading us to propose a theory of emotional hybridization. (shrink)

De nombreux philosophes anglo-saxons de tradition analytique nient qu'un animal puisse penser, ou qu'on puisse accéder à sa subjectivité. Nous développons une réponse alternative. La légitimité d'une évaluation de l'intelligence de l'animal repose d'abord sur une familiarité acquise à son contact au cours d'une histoire partagée. Elle est propre à celui qui vit avec un animal mais aussi à l'expert qui a acquis une connaissance de l'animal à la suite d'une pratique professionnelle élaborée. C'est parce que nous interagissons avec l'animal (...) comme s'il était un sujet que nous sommes prêts à lui accorder une intelligence susceptible de rendre intelligibles nos relations avec lui. L'intelligence d'un même animal n'est pas fixée une fois pour toutes. Elle est en partie dépendante des dispositifs humains dans lesquels elle se trouve impliquée. La question d'une véritable zoologie se pose, qui étudie l'intelligence du vivant dans la perspective des sciences sociales aussi bien que dans celle de la biologie. (shrink)