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Counterfactual reasoning: Inferences from hypothetical conditionals

In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology. Erlbaum (1994)

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  1. Chess Masters' Hypothesis Testing in Games of Dynamic Equilibrium.Michelle B. Cowley-Cunningham - 2016 - SSRN Econometrics: Econometric and Statistical Methods – General eJournal, Vol. 9, Issue 5: Jan 12, 2016.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed technical protocol analysis of chess masters' evaluative expertise, paying particular attention to the analysis of the structure of their memory process in evaluating foreseen possibilities in games of dynamic equilibrium. The paper has two purposes. First, to publish a results chapter from my DPhil thesis (in revised journal article form) attending to the measurement of foresight in chess masters' evaluation process, testing alternative theories of cognitive expertise in the domain of (...)
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  • Hypothesis Testing: How We Foresee Falsification in Competitive Games.Michelle Cowley-Cunningham - 2017 - Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing.
    Each day people are presented with circumstances that may require speculation. Scientists may ponder questions such as why a star is born or how rainbows are made, psychologists may ask social questions such as why people are prejudiced, and military strategists may imagine what the consequences of their actions might be. Speculations may lead to the generation of putative explanations called hypotheses. But it is by checking if hypotheses accurately reflect the encountered facts that lead to sensible behaviour demonstrating a (...)
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  • A model theory of modal reasoning.Victoria A. Bell & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (1):25-51.
    This paper presents a new theory of modal reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what may or may not be the case, and what must or must not be the case. It postulates that individuals construct models of the premises in which they make explicit only what is true. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one model, whereas it is necessary if it holds in all the models. The theory makes three predictions, which are corroborated experimentally. First, conclusions (...)
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