Many scholars and activists favor banning illicit businesses, especially given that such businesses constitute a large part of the global economy. But these businesses are commonly operated as if they are subject only to the ethical norms their management chooses to recognize, and as a result they sometimes harm innocent people. This can happen in part because there are no effective legal constraints on illicit businesses, and in part because it seems theoretically impossible to dispose definitively of arguments that support (...) moral relativism. Progress is being made, however, towards a “second best” arrangement consisting of widespread institutional agreements regarding ethical norms. This development might eventually enable us to transcend moral relativism in some respects. Indeed, although some business ethicists who examine illicit business practices accept moral relativism, others attempt to surmount it. The latters’ endeavor, I show, is cross-cultural in nature in that it involves businesses that are deemed illicit in at least one but not every culture. I then recall some traditional solutions and their limits: ideological teachings are culture-specific, hence both temporally and spatially limited; legal constraints, though potentially helpful, are too diverse hence often narrow in reach. Especially problematic are defense industry businesses, which are inherently transcultural and, though uniquely harmful, are not effectively banned in any culture. Harm to quality of life (QoL) can, however, be measured. So I recommend institutional support for international human rights tied to QoL data as a workable way to counter moral relativism regarding illicit businesses. (shrink)

The present article is a continuation of the debate two sets of authors have been engaging in regarding one type of maturity mismatching: borrowing short and lending long. All four authors had agreed that this practice can set up the Austrian Business Cycle; the present author denies that BSLL would be a legitimate commercial interaction in the free society; Bagus and Howden continue to maintain that it would be licit. Our main criticism of Bagus and Howden is a reductio ad (...) absurdum: that this opens them up to the charge of embracing the doctrine of market failure; this is something highly problematic for the two of them, since all four contributors to this debate are well-known supporters of laissez faire capitalism. (shrink)

The option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels. It has been used within the Diamond and Dybvig framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance. This literature has, however, been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts. It will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes (...) bankrupt because of a bank run, as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null, and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt. It will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt-related agency problems and under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies. It will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems. (shrink)

Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 18(2):179–194, 2011 ) argue that one cannot distinguish between deposits and loans due to the continuum problem of maturities and because future goods do not exist—both essential characteristics that distinguish deposit from loan contracts. In a similar way but leading to opposite conclusions (Cachanosky, forthcoming) maintains that both maturity mismatching and fractional reserve banking are ethically justified as these contracts are equivalent. We argue herein that the economic and legal differences between genuine deposit and (...) loan contracts are clear. This implies different legal obligations for these contracts, a necessary step in assessing the ethics of both fractional reserve banking and maturity mismatching. While the former is economically, legally, and perhaps most importantly ethically problematic, there are no such troubles with the latter. (shrink)

This paper traces the recent debate over the legitimacy of maturity mismatching and fractional reserve banking. It shows that there is common ground between Bagus and Howden :399–406, 2009, 106:295–300, 2012) on the one hand and Evans on the other regarding contractual arrangements that lead to fractional reserve banking, while both agree that fractional reserve banking that arises out of a bailment or storage contract constitutes fraud. Block and Barnett :711–716, 2009, 100:229–238, 2011) stress the illegitimacy of fractional reserve banking (...) for creating more money substitutes than there is actual money. While it is true that fractional reserve banks are capable of creating money, this activity still cannot be regarded as fraudulent using a common law definition of fraud for it can only take place with requisite client collaboration that makes it impossible to identify a victim. (shrink)

The financial crisis has led to new interest in the ethics of financial markets. In this article, we further the debate on the nature of banking contracts by showing that the fundamental subjective purposes of loan and deposit contracts are irreconcilable. Any resultant mixture of the two contracts is a legal aberration. We consider a mutual fund as an important and legitimate alternative to the common demand deposit to provide high liquidity and some yield without offering full availability of a (...) nominal sum. Besides being a close substitute for how many deposit accounts function today, the mutual fund has the additional benefit of satisfying all legal and ethical requirements. Loan and investment contracts allow for the “bank” to make use of their clients’ funds while the intents of money owners are clearly classified without running into legal or ethical problems. (shrink)

If fractional-reserve demand deposits are common, and illegitimate, an obvious flaw in the banking system is exposed. However, this article maintains that the only reason why demand deposits may be considered illegitimate is because of a way of defining them that renders them almost irrelevant. This article provides a response to Bagus et al., and identifies examples of how they misrepresent Evans. It also provides further considerations on the tradeoffs relating to the availability of a deposit; methodological subjectivism; and the (...) potential for hybrid contracts. Deposit and loan contracts may be hard to mix, but the actual results of doing so should not be ignored. (shrink)

This article contributes to a recent debate between Barnett and Block : 711–716, 2009), Bagus and Howden : 399–406, 2009), Barnett and Block, Cachanosky and Bagus and Howden regarding the conceptual distinction between demand deposits and time deposits. It is argued that from an economic perspective there is nothing inherently fraudulent or illegitimate about deposit accounts that are available ‘on demand’, but that this relies on certain contractual provisions. Particular attention is drawn to option clauses and withdrawal clauses, which “solve” (...) the problems raised by Barnett and Block, and Bagus and Howden. Previous authors have also neglected the asset side of banks balance sheets, and this is shown to further justify the legitimacy of fractional reserve banking. (shrink)