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  1. How Partisanship Can Moderate the Influence of Communicated Information on the Beliefs of Agents Aiming to Form True Beliefs.Maarten van Doorn - 2025 - Social Epistemology 39 (1):24-39.
    Partisan epistemology – individuals granting greater credibility to co-partisan sources in evaluating information – is often taken to be evidence of directionally motivated reasoning in which concerns about group membership override concerns about accuracy. Against this dominant view, I outline a novel accuracy-based account of this mode of reasoning. According to this account, partisan epistemology stems from the inference that co-partisans are more likely to be right as they have superior epistemic access to the relevant facts and seek to realize (...)
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  • (1 other version)The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: a closer look at the evidence.Maarten van Doorn - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (4):548-578.
    Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information (...)
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  • (1 other version)The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: A closer look at the evidence.Maarten van Doorn - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (1):1-31.
    Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information (...)
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  • (1 other version)Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality.Maarten van Doorn - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In vice epistemology, bad epistemic outcomes, such as maintaining false beliefs, are interpreted as indicators of blameworthy irrationality. Conversely, a growing trend in philosophical psychology advocates for environmentalist explanations, suggesting these outcomes emerge because rational cognitive processes of faultless individuals falter due to polluted environmental inputs. Building on concrete examples, I first offer a systematic analysis of the relative explanatory merits of that environmentalist project. I then use this analysis to advance the rationality debate, which has recently been identified as (...)
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  • On being drawn to different types of arguments: a mouse-tracking study.Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen & Mika Hietanen - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
    How people distinguish well-justified from poorly justified arguments is not well known. To study the involvement of intuitive and analytic cognitive processes, we contrasted participants’ personal beliefs with argument strength that was determined in relation to established criteria of sound argumentation. In line with previous findings indicating that people have a myside bias, participants (N = 249) made more errors on conflict than on no-conflict trials. On conflict trials, errors and correct responses were practically equal in terms of response times (...)
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