This essay develops a version of non‐reductive (“soft,” liberal, non‐scientistic) naturalism based on an integration of pragmatism and transcendental philosophy. In critical dialogue with philosophers such as Quine, Strawson, and McDowell, this version of naturalism, understood as an open research program, is argued to be more compelling than other (non‐transcendental) variants of non‐reductive naturalism. It is suggested that any naturalist must examine how we are able to view ourselves as elements of the natural world; accordingly, the question concerning the contingency (...) of the transcendental “us” is raised. The related issue of realism underlying debates on naturalism is also discussed. This paper thus contributes to the current naturalism debates by distinguishing between transcendental and non‐transcendental non‐reductive naturalisms and by emphasizing the entanglement of the issues of naturalism and realism. (shrink)