While the contemporary biomimicry movement is associated primarily with the idea of taking Nature as model for technological innovation, it also contains a normative or ethical principle—Nature as measure—that may be treated in relative isolation from the better known principle of Nature as model. Drawing on discussions of the principle of Nature as measure put forward by Benyus and Jackson, while at the same time situating these discussions in relation to contemporary debates in the philosophy of biomimicry : 364–387, 2011; (...) Dicks in Philos Technol, doi: 10.1007/s13347-015-0210-2, 2015; Blok and Gremmen in J Agric Environ Ethics 29:203–217, 2016), the aim of this paper is to explore the relation between the principle of Nature as measure and environmental ethics. This leads to the argument that mainstream formulations of environmental ethics share the common trait of seeing our ethical relation to Nature as primarily involving duties to protect, preserve, or conserve various values in Nature, and that, in doing so, they problematically either overlook or dismiss as anthropocentric the possibility that Nature may provide measures, understood in terms of ecological standards, against which our own practices, or at least some of them, may be judged—a way of thinking I call “biomimetic ethics”. The practical consequences of this argument are significant. Whereas mainstream environmental ethics has been applied above all to such issues as wilderness preservation, natural resource management, and animal rights and welfare, biomimetic ethics is applicable rather to the question of how we produce, use, and consume things, and, as such, may potentially provide the basic ethical framework required to underpin the transition to a circular, bio-based, solar economy. (shrink)

Agroecology has been criticized for being more labor-intensive than other more industrialized forms of agriculture. We challenge the assertion that labor input in agriculture has to be generally minimized and argue that besides quantity of work one should also consider the quality of work involved in farming. Early assessments on work quality condemned the deskilling of the rural workforce, whereas later criticisms have concentrated around issues related to fair trade and food sovereignty. We bring into the discussion the concept of (...) contributive justice to welcome the added labor-intensity of agroecological farming. Contributive justice demands a work environment where people are stimulated to develop skills and learn to be productive. It also suggests a fairer distribution of meaningful work and tedious tasks. Building on the notion of contributive justice we explore which capabilities and types of social relationships are sustainably promoted and reinforced by agroecological farming practices. We argue that agroecological principles encourage a reconceptualization of farm work. Farmers are continuously stimulated to develop skills and acquire valuable experiential knowledge on local ecosystems and agricultural techniques. Further, generalized ecological studies recognize the significance of the farmer’s observations on natural resources management. This contributes to the development of a number of capabilities and leads to more bargaining power, facilitating self-determination. Hereby farm work is made more attractive to a younger generation, which is an essential factor for safeguarding the continuity of family farms. (shrink)

Agricultural research and education ended 100 years of funding under the Hatch Act with a decade of unprecedented criticism of goals and outcomes. This paper examines the way that planners can accommodate some of these criticisms within a framework for understanding the ethical and social goals of agriculture that is consistent with traditional practice. The paper goes on to state that some criticisms are so fundamental that they cannot be readily incorporated into this framework. They must be regarded as a (...) challenge, both politically and intellectually, to longstanding practices within academic institutions devoted to agriculture. (shrink)

The concept of animal welfare refersto the animal''s quality of life. The choice ofdefinition always reflects some basicvaluation. This makes a particular conceptionof welfare value-dependent. Also, the animalhusbandry system reflects certain values oraims. The values reflected in the chosenconception of animal welfare ought tocorrespond to values aimed for in the husbandrysystem. The IFOAM Basic Standards and otherwritings dealing with organic animal husbandryshould be taken as a departure point for adiscussion of how to interpret the conceptionof welfare in organic farming systems. (...) Theconception of welfare is related to two corevalues in the organic agriculture movement.These core values should be considered in termsof (1) aim for holistic view and (2) aim forsustainability. A third, implicit core value,based on bio- and ecocentric views: (3) respectfor nature is needed as a supplement to thesetwo core values. There are importantimplications of these core values for an``organic'''' conception of animal welfare and forconfronting two dilemmas due to conflictinginterests. Comparisons among the three commonlyused welfare definitions will show thesuperiority of the third approach, which canprovide an outline for a conception of animalwelfare more suitable for organic farmingsystems. This outline combines a holisticecocentric approach with respect for theindividual animal, and it can be used as thebasis for a complex definition with emphasis onnatural behavior. Such a systemic approachconsiders welfare in relation to differentsystemic levels. The systemic view also offerspossibilities for resolving the dilemmas in newways. (shrink)