Does speaking up ruin one’s life? Organizational and whistleblowing research largely accept that “whistleblower” is a negative label that effects one’s well-being. Whistleblowing research also emphasizes the drawn-out process of speaking up. The result is a narrative of the whistleblower as someone who suffers indefinitely. In this paper, I draw on theories of stigma, labelling, and identity, specifically stigmatized identity, to provide a more nuanced understanding of whistleblower stigma as relational and temporary. I analyse two cases of whistleblowing, one where (...) the label “whistleblower” was accepted, and one where it was eventually rejected. By comparing how the whistleblower responds to stigmatizing and non-stigmatizing others, I explore how whistleblower stigmatization emerges, or does not, in interactions. This paper makes two important contributions. First, I add to the growing research on whistleblower stigmatization a more nuanced and developed framework: one that sees the interaction between whistleblowers and others as relational. Second, I provide an understanding of the identity “whistleblower” as one that can be temporary and revisable. Research has highlighted how whistleblowing is a process, but little attention has been paid to how one “moves on” from being a whistleblower and the potential stigmatization associated with the role. Rather than assuming a whistleblower is stuck with this identity—and the associated stigma—for life, I provide insight on how “whistleblower” can be a positive label that opens one up to support, and even when it is stigmatized, it does not have to be an end state. (shrink)

This study uses a rational ethical decision-making framework to examine the influence of moral intensity (potential harm and social pressure) on whistleblowing intention and behaviour using organisational commitment as a moderator. A scenario was developed, and an online questionnaire was used to conduct an empirical analysis on the responses of 533 participants. The mean age and years of work experience of the respondents were 31 and 8.2 years, respectively. The results show, first, that while moral intensity is correlated with whistleblowing (...) intention, only the potential harm is positively correlated with such intention. Second, potential harm and social pressure differentially affect whistleblower choice of using an internal or external channel. Third, organisational commitment has a moderated mediation effect among moral intensity, whistleblowing intention and behaviour. Fourth, whistleblowers may be grouped into four conceptual types: indifferent, rebel, mature and spoil. Finally, theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

This article uses a sample of 3076 employees working in the USA to examine the relationship between the frequency of unethical behavior that employees observe in their organization and their intention to whistleblow. The results confirm the expected curvilinear relationship based on the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct. This relationship is a combination of a diminishing negative relationship between the frequency of observed unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow internally and a linear positive relationship between the frequency of observed (...) unethical behavior and the intention to whistleblow externally. The beliefs of employees about how supportive their management is when handling whistleblowing reports moderates the relationship between the frequency of unethical behavior employees observe and their intention to whistleblow. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and several other national corporate governance codes, whistleblowing policies have been implemented in a growing number of companies. Existing research indicates that this type of governance codes has a limited direct effect on ethical or whistleblowing behaviour whereas whistleblowing policies at the corporate level seem to be more effective. Therefore, evidence on the impact of (inter)national corporate governance codes on the content of corporate whistleblowing policies is important to understand their (...) indirect impact on whistleblowing behaviour. This study analyzes the contents of whistleblowing policies, and parts of corporate codes of conduct and codes of ethics, describing such policies of 56 leading European companies. By classifying the contents in seven categories, an exploratory framework was created. General contents often identified were: applicability to all employees, a group-wide scope and an authoritative tone. The most common general violations to report were breaches of internal policies and external regulations or laws. The more specific violations most frequently mentioned were criminal offences and dangers to health and safety or the environment. Contacts to report to were the direct or indirect supervisors, a compliance officer or a confidential "hotline" facility. A confidentiality guarantee was common and anonymous reporting was often possible, though sometimes discouraged. Protection against retaliation is stated by ensuring that retaliation will not happen, prohibiting it or making it punishable. The requirement of good faith was frequently given. Finally, investigation of the report was often guaranteed. Surprisingly little information is given on the treatment of whistleblowers reporting an unfounded complaint in good faith, or reporting a violation they were involved in. The study's findings are most relevant to companies without a whistleblowing policy or those that intend to benchmark their policies, and to pan-European standard setters. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of an observer’s value orientation and personality type on attitudes toward whistleblowing. Based on a review of the literature we generated three hypotheses to explain the relationship between these two factors and attitudes toward whistleblowing, and these were tested using data collected from 490 university students in South Korea. The survey comprises two parts, a measure of MBTI personality types, and a section assessing value orientations and attitudes toward whistleblowing. Regression analysis was conducted to clarify (...) the influence of the independent variables. The study offers two main contributions. First, it examines what role an observer’s value orientation and personality type play in determining the attitudes. Second, it provides insights into designing customized ethical training programs and developing policy aimed at changing negative attitudes toward whistleblowing. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and several other national corporate governance codes, whistleblowing policies have been implemented in a growing number of companies. Existing research indicates that this type of governance codes has a limited direct effect on ethical or whistleblowing behaviour whereas whistleblowing policies at the corporate level seem to be more effective. Therefore, evidence on the impact of (inter)national corporate governance codes on the content of corporate whistleblowing policies is important to understand their (...) indirect impact on whistleblowing behaviour. This study analyzes the contents of whistleblowing policies, and parts of corporate codes of conduct and codes of ethics, describing such policies of 56 leading European companies. By classifying the contents in seven categories, an exploratory framework was created. General contents often identified were: applicability to all employees, a group-wide scope and an authoritative tone. The most common general violations to report were breaches of internal policies and external regulations or laws. The more specific violations most frequently mentioned were criminal offences and dangers to health and safety or the environment. Contacts to report to were the direct or indirect supervisors, a compliance officer or a confidential “hotline” facility. A confidentiality guarantee was common and anonymous reporting was often possible, though sometimes discouraged. Protection against retaliation is stated by ensuring that retaliation will not happen, prohibiting it or making it punishable. The requirement of good faith was frequently given. Finally, investigation of the report was often guaranteed. Surprisingly little information is given on the treatment of whistleblowers reporting an unfounded complaint in good faith, or reporting a violation they were involved in. The study’s findings are most relevant to companies without a whistleblowing policy or those that intend to benchmark their policies, and to pan-European standard setters. (shrink)