What does it mean to be responsible for structural injustice? According to Iris Marion Young, the ongoing and socially embedded character of structural injustice imposes a future-oriented obligation to work with others toward creating remedial, institutional change. Young explains, ‘Political responsibility seeks less to reckon debts than to bring about results’ (Young, 2003, p. 13). This paper conceptually develops how the goal of remediation bears on responsibility in relation to structural injustice. Does the attribution of responsibility in this context call (...) upon individuals to simply do anything in efforts to affect progressive change? If not, then to what extent are these attributions of responsibility action guiding? On what basis do they direct agents to effectively intervene on relevant conditions and processes rather than act in ways that exacerbate the injustice? I explore the role of etiological explanation in the attribution and acceptance of corrective responsibility, which refers to diagnosis of the operative causation of unjust outcomes. After probing tensions within prominent models of corrective responsibility, I offer my own model attempting to resolve those issues. I argue the forward-looking nature of the call to participate in remedying social problems includes a demand for agents to do so in a way that is itself responsible. I theorize a framework of taking responsibility responsibly. This framework accounts for the moral difference between a conscientiously formulated program of remedial action and a quixotic exercise in reckless delusion. (shrink)

On a widely accepted view, what gives meaning to our lives is success in valuable ground projects. However, philosophers like Kieran Setiya have recently challenged the value of such orientation towards the future, and argued that meaningful living is instead a matter of engaging in atelic activities that are complete in themselves at each moment. This chapter argues that insofar as what is at issue is meaningfulness in its primary existential sense, strongly atelic activities do not suffice for meaning. Instead, (...) finding one’s life meaningful is warranted both by sustainable success in valuable prospective (future-oriented) projects, and by success in reflexive projects that aim to promote or realize a practice-dependent value that can be realized at each moment, but never for good. The latter kind of activities are only weakly atelic, since their aim remains distinct from the activity, and individual actions gain significance from serving a long-term commitment. Thus, whether our ground projects are prospective or reflexive, what we do at each moment contributes to leading a meaningful life only when it’s connected in the right way to what we do at other moments. (shrink)