This paper puts the theories of Donald Davidson into conversation with those of Edmund Husserl, arguing that their work can be read as representing different species of a singular kind, with both defending: (1) versions of anomalous monism, and (2) the legitimacy of event explanation by way of intentionality, rationality, and talk of agentive action. Through these they provide an account of the mental that aligns with the physical while also avoiding the mental’s nomological capture, or its reduction to physicalist (...) causality. A demonstration will be provided in closing as to why this Husserlian-Davidson position is worth exploring, as we will utilize their conjunction as a platform for responding to problems raised against anomalous monism and the intentional rationalization of action by behaviorists, eliminativists, pragmatists, and conceptualists. In this manner their paired reading will be shown to enlighten us about the nature of their individual theories, while simultaneously deepening our understanding of the nature of the (1-2) problematic that their theories shared in common. (shrink)