This article examines Risse and Wollner’s discussion and rejection of several strategies a) in favour of developed countries subsidising their producers, and b) against the relocation of firms operating on their territory. It argues that their critical review of these strategies remains incomplete and therefore not decisive. It starts by bringing into relief two blind spots in their moral assessment of subsidies. The first concerns the imperfect nature of the general duties of global justice they focus on; the second concerns (...) their understanding of the relation between these duties and duties of social justice. While addressing these two difficulties, it presents another possible strategy in support of subsidies, which Risse and Wollner fail to examine: the ‘equal citizenship’ strategy. This strategy is mobilised again in an assessment of Risse and Wollner’s treatment of relocations. In this context, some doubts are raised about the remedy Risse and Wollner prescribe to overcome both social injustices and exploitative relocations ― namely, the domestic redistribution by governments of the gains of international trade. It is argued that such a redistribution is both insufficient to combat social exclusion and threatened by the very practice of trade liberalisation that Risse and Wollner seek to defend. (shrink)

In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...) controversial category. Some have argued that the concept of supererogation is paradoxical because on one hand, supererogatory actions are (by definition) supposed to be morally good, indeed morally best, actions. But then if they are morally best, why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional? In short: how can an action that is morally best to perform fail to be what one is morally required to do? The source of this alleged paradox has been dubbed the ‘good-ought tie-up’. In our article, we address this alleged paradox by first making a phenomenological case for the reality of instances of genuine supererogatory actions, and then, by reflecting on the relevant phenomenology, explaining why there is no genuine paradox. Our explanation appeals to the idea that moral reasons can play what we call amerit conferring role. The basic idea is that moral reasons that favor supererogatory actions function to confer merit on the actions they favor—they play a merit conferring role—and can do without also requiring the actions in question. Hence, supererogatory actions can be both good and morally meritorious to perform yet still be morally optional. Recognition of a merit conferring role unties the good-ought tie up, and (as we further argue) there are good reasons, independent of helping to resolve the alleged paradox, for recognizing this sort of role that moral reasons may play. (shrink)