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  1. How Strong is the Confirmation of a Hypothesis by Significant Data?Thomas Bartelborth - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):277-291.
    The aim of the article is to propose a way to determine to what extent a hypothesis H is confirmed if it has successfully passed a classical significance test. Bayesians have already raised many serious objections against significance testing, but in doing so they have always had to rely on epistemic probabilities and a further Bayesian analysis, which are rejected by classical statisticians. Therefore, I will suggest a purely frequentist evaluation procedure for significance tests that should also be accepted by (...)
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  • Direct Inference and Probabilistic Accounts of Induction.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-22.
    Schurz argues that probabilistic accounts of induction fail. In particular, he criticises probabilistic accounts of induction that appeal to direct inference principles, including subjective Bayesian approaches and objective Bayesian approaches. In this paper, I argue that Schurz’ preferred direct inference principle, namely Reichenbach’s Principle of the Narrowest Reference Class, faces formidable problems in a standard probabilistic setting. Furthermore, the main alternative direct inference principle, Lewis’ Principal Principle, is also hard to reconcile with standard probabilism. So, I argue, standard probabilistic approaches (...)
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  • Frequentist statistical inference without repeated sampling.Paul Vos & Don Holbert - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-25.
    Frequentist inference typically is described in terms of hypothetical repeated sampling but there are advantages to an interpretation that uses a single random sample. Contemporary examples are given that indicate probabilities for random phenomena are interpreted as classical probabilities, and this interpretation of equally likely chance outcomes is applied to statistical inference using urn models. These are used to address Bayesian criticisms of frequentist methods. Recent descriptions of p-values, confidence intervals, and power are viewed through the lens of classical probability (...)
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  • Is the Humean Defeated by Induction?Benjamin T. H. Smart - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):319-332.
    Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong 1983; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) have argued that Humeans are unable to justify their inductive inferences, as Humean laws are nothing but the sum of their instances. In this paper I argue against these necessitarian claims. I show that Armstrong is committed to the explanatory value of Humean laws (in the form of universally quantified statements), and that contra Armstrong, brute regularities often do have genuine explanatory value. I finish with a Humean attempt (...)
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  • Induction: A Logical Analysis.Uwe Saint-Mont - 2022 - Foundations of Science 27 (2):455-487.
    The aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume’s problem. To this end, induction is treated within a straightforward formal paradigm, i.e., several connected levels of abstraction. Within this setting, many concrete models are discussed. On the one hand, models from mathematics, statistics and information science demonstrate how induction might succeed. On the other hand, standard examples from philosophy highlight fundamental difficulties. Thus it transpires that the difference between unbounded and bounded inductive steps is crucial: (...)
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  • What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?William Peden - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1145-1161.
    David Armstrong argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the (...)
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  • The Material Theory of Induction at the Frontiers of Science.William Peden - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):247-263.
    According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all reasonable inductive inferences are justified in virtue of background knowledge about local uniformities in nature. These local uniformities indicate that our samples are likely to be representative of our target population in our inductions. However, a variety of critics have noted that there are many circumstances in which induction seems to be reasonable, yet such background knowledge is apparently absent. I call such an absence of circumstances ‘the frontiers of science', (...)
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  • Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction.William Peden - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):672-695.
    John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, (...)
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  • Does the Dome Defeat the Material Theory of Induction?William Peden - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all inductive inferences are justified by local facts, rather than their formal features or some grand principles of nature's uniformity. Recently, Richard Dawid (2015) has offered a challenge to this theory: in an adaptation of Norton's own celebrated "Dome" thought experiment, it seems that there are certain inductions that are intuitively reasonable, but which do not have any local facts that could serve to justify them in accordance with Norton's requirements. Dawid's (...)
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  • BonJour’s Defense of Induction: An A Priorist Way Out?Kevin Kimble - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):449-476.
    Laurence BonJour a proposé une façon novatrice de défendre son principe inductif en réponse à une proposition posée par Hume et pouvant être remise en question. Dans cet article, j’élabore et fais la critique de la stratégie de BonJour. Au cours de mon développement, j’attire l’attention sur les critiques formulées par Anthony Brueckner à l’égard de l’approche de BonJour, détaillant les raisons pour lesquelles elles ne parviennent pas à réfuter de manière cohérente l’argument de BonJour. En distinguant et en appliquant (...)
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  • The Statistical Riddle of Induction.Eric Johannesson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken together, this would indicate (...)
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  • Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia.James Franklin - 2003 - Sydney, Australia: Macleay Press.
    A polemical account of Australian philosophy up to 2003, emphasising its unique aspects (such as commitment to realism) and the connections between philosophers' views and their lives. Topics include early idealism, the dominance of John Anderson in Sydney, the Orr case, Catholic scholasticism, Melbourne Wittgensteinianism, philosophy of science, the Sydney disturbances of the 1970s, Francofeminism, environmental philosophy, the philosophy of law and Mabo, ethics and Peter Singer. Realist theories especially praised are David Armstrong's on universals, David Stove's on logical probability (...)
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  • Logic in Reality.Joseph Brenner - 2008 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    The work is the presentation of a logical theory - Logic in Reality (LIR) - and of applications of that theory in natural science and philosophy, including ...
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  • The Problem of Induction.John Vickers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Donald Cary Williams.Keith Campbell, James Franklin & Douglas Ehring - 2013 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. pp. 0.
    Stanford Encyclopedia article surveying the life and work of D.C. Williams, notably in defending realism in metaphysics in the mid-twentieth century and in justifying induction by the logic of statistical inference.
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  • Induction: The Glory of Science and Philosophy.Uwe Saint-Mont - unknown
    The aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume's problem, the well-known problem of induction. To this end, it is very useful to apply his differentiation between ``relations of ideas'' and ``matters of fact'', and to reconsider earlier approaches. In so doing, we consider the problem formally, as well as empirically. Next, received attempts to solve the problem are discussed. The basic structure of inductive problems is exposed in chap. 6. Our final conclusions are to (...)
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  • Regularity Theory and Inductive Scepticism: The Fight Against Armstrong.Benjamin Smart - 2009 - Lyceum 11 (1).
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