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  1. Adjusting our epistemic expectations: Explaining experience with nonreductive psychophysical laws.Matthew Soleiman - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):89-90.
    A response to "I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation" by Brian Earp.
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  • Why Do Colours Look the Way They Do?Nicholas Unwin - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (3):405-424.
    A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to perceptual qualities of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. The internal phenomenological structure of colours is considered here in some detail, and a comparison is (...)
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  • The mysterianism of Owen Flanagan's normative mind science.Mikael Leidenhag - 2018 - Zygon 53 (1):29-48.
    This article critically analyzes Owen Flanagan's physicalism and attempt at deriving ethical normativity from current neuroscience. It is argued that neurophysicalism, despite Flanagan's harsh critique of “the new mysterians,” entails a form of mysterianism and that it fails to appropriately ground human mentality within physicalism. Flanagan seeks to bring spirituality and a physicalist ontology together by showing how it is possible to derive an account of the good life from science. This attempt is critiqued and it is shown that Flanagan (...)
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  • The unsuitability of emergence theory for pentecostal theology: A response to bradnick and McCall.Mikael Leidenhag & Joanna Leidenhag - 2018 - Zygon 53 (1):258-273.
    In this response to David Bradnick's and Bradford McCall's defense of Amos Yong's usage of emergence theory, we defend our previous argument regarding the tension between Yong's Pentecostal commitments and the philosophical entailments of emergence theory. We clarify and extend our previous concerns in three ways. First, we explore the difficulties of construing divine action naturalistically. Second, we clarify the problems of employing supervenience in theology. Third, we show why Bradnick's and McCall's advice to Yong to adopt weak emergence is (...)
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