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  1. Queer revelations: Desire, identity, and self-deceit.Leslie A. Howe - 2005 - Philosophical Forum 36 (3):221–242.
    I argue that understanding the self in terms of narrative construction does not preclude the possibility of error concerning one’s own self. Identity is a projection of first and second-order desires and a product of choice in relation to desire. Self-deceit appears in this connection as a response to an identity that one has constructed through choice and/or desire but not acknowledged in one’s self-account, reflecting a conflict between desires or a motivated failure to account. This analysis is applied primarily (...)
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  • Self-deception needs no explaining.Herbert Fingarette - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.
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  • Self-Deception: A Reflexive Dilemma.T. S. Champlin - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (201):281 - 299.
    It is not easy to see how self-deception is possible because the man who deceives himself seems to be required to play two incompatible roles, that of deceiver and that of deceived. This makes self-deception sound about as difficult as presiding at one's own funeral. Many attempts have been made to remove the air of paradox from self-deception. These attempts are all unsuccessful, and they are best seen as expressions of philosophical puzzlement rather than as actual solutions. In particular, the (...)
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  • Rorty on belief and self‐deception.Béla Szabados - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):464-473.
    In this note I argue that although Rorty's programme (Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 4) to bring into focus the role that belief plays in self?deception is a salutary one, her actual claims obscure that role. It is also contended that Rorty fails to de?mythologize self?deception, since her account is either paradox?ridden or else describes a concept recognizably distinct from the concept of self?deception.
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  • Defining self-deception.Jennifer Radden - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (1):103-120.
    In this paper I shall first expose a weakness shared by several philosophical discussions of self-deception: I shall show that these discussions have failed to give it a complete analysis. The apparent phenomenon of self-deception is all too familiar, and yet its adequate characterization in general terms is wanting. More exactly, I shall argue that to understand self-deception statically, as these accounts have done, has been—and must be—to fail to give a characterization of it as a state of mind, sufficient (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Critical notice.Alan R. Drengson - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):475-484.
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