The truth-justification is an enduring explanation for valuing free speech. This paper seeks to advance an account of “assertion”, found in speech act theory, that can identify speech which contributes to truth-discovery in a nuanced way. I apply the dialectic theory of assertion which emphasises the language game of giving and asking for reasons to believe things as assertional social practice. In doing so, I consider what “moves” in this game make sense from a truth-discovery perspective, drawing together contemporary and (...) foundational work on assertion in linguistics to fit the normative context of law. Speech act theory is often invoked in current free speech literature to identify regulable speech, but less typically to identify speech that warrants legal protection. I contextualise my theory within this existing legal work and show how the model I advocate for applies across many formulations of the truth-justification to offer comprehensive explanatory and justificatory power. I also explore the potential appeal of alternative theories of assertion and explain why they are a poor fit in comparison to the dialectical account. (shrink)

Truth-makers are the dark matter of metaphysics. On the one hand, truth-makers seem obvious and necessary: if there are truths then there must be something that makes these truths true. On the other hand, it’s proven difficult to say exactly what these truth-makers are. Even defenders disagree about what sort of entity truth-makers are or whether all truths have truth-makers. Skeptics have questioned whether truth-makers are actually so obvious and necessary, or even whether they exist at all. Here I offer (...) an account of this unhappy state of affairs and a modest proposal. First, I argue that not only are there no good arguments for truth-makers but it’s unlikely that there ever will be. Second I point to how much can be done without resorting to truth-makers in the first place: they are not as essential as often assumed. Finally, I conclude that we needn’t jettison the concept of truth-makers entirely. Understood in a modest and pragmatic spirit we can hold on to truth-makers while recognizing their inherent limitations. (shrink)