In his justly celebrated Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock evaluates the judgment of economic and political experts by rigorously testing their ability to make accurate predictions. He finds that ability profoundly limited, implying that expert judgment is virtually useless, if not worse. He concludes by proposing a project that would seek to improve experts' performance by holding them publicly accountable for their claims. But Tetlock's methods severely underestimate the value of expert opinion. Despite their notorious disagreements, experts have highly (...) pertinent information and advice in many areas of public policy. The main problem with experts is that political actors seize on their most extreme views in one direction or the other, and overlook their areas of general agreement and the core of relatively reliable information that they provide. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHélène Landemore claims that under certain conditions, democracies with universal suffrage will tend to make smarter and better decisions than epistocracies, even though most citizens in modern democracies are extremely ignorant about politics. However, there is ample empirical evidence that citizens make systematic errors. If so, it is fatal to Landemore's defense of democracy, which, if it works at all, applies only to highly idealized situations that are unlikely to occur in the real world. Critics of democracy will find little (...) in Landemore's defense of democracy to make them change their minds. (shrink)

This paper considers how Bryan Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality may manifest in various political institutional arrangements, building off the demand curve for irrationality. Mob democracy, anarchy, autocracy, and constitutionally constrained democracy are the governance structures addressed. While anarchy is strictly better than mob democracy, under certain conditions, democracy, anarchy, or constitutionally constrained democracy may yield the best outcomes depending on the circumstances.

From Mill to, most recently, Bryan Caplan, political and economic elites have been seen as the solution to the public’s ignorance and incompetence. In order to show that elites are actually more competent than the public, however, we would have to find out what type of knowledge is necessary to enact good public policy. The empirical evidence shows that economic experts have a slight advantage over the general public in knowledge of how to achieve policy goals. But, contrary to Caplan, (...) the evidence indicates that economists don’t possess significant predictive knowledge, and that general economic laws are of little help in predicting the magnitude of the effects of a specific policy in a multi‐variable, complex world. When we adopt a more complex understanding of the reasons behind policy choice, and consider rules and principles in addition to goal pursuit, the slight edge of economic experts evaporates. (shrink)

In his justly celebrated Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock evaluates the judgment of economic and political experts by rigorously testing their ability to make accurate predictions. He finds that ability profoundly limited, implying that expert judgment is virtually useless, if not worse. He concludes by proposing a project that would seek to improve experts' performance by holding them publicly accountable for their claims. But Tetlock's methods severely underestimate the value of expert opinion. Despite their notorious disagreements, experts have highly (...) pertinent information and advice in many areas of public policy. The main problem with experts is that political actors seize on their most extreme views in one direction or the other, and overlook their areas of general agreement and the core of relatively reliable information that they provide. (shrink)

This symposium’s objections to my book fall into two main categories: philosophical and empirical. The philosophical objections are largely sophistical. If we took them seriously, they would invalidate far more than my book: We would also have to give up social science and common sense. The empirical objections, in contrast, are often thoughtful and important. The most notable: Kiewiet and Mattozzi’s vigorous defense of the American public’s free‐trade credentials, and Wittman’s doubts about the magnitude of the belief gap between economists (...) and the public. But Kiewiet and Mattozzi put too much weight on a single survey question; and the belief gap between economists and the public is much larger than the belief gap between the American public’s far left and far right. (shrink)