In this article, I address the issue of the sale of human organs and the moral implications of a market in human organs under the aegis of Christian Bioethics. I argue that moral issues of this kind cannot be adequately addressed from the point of view of moral frameworks which point exclusively to procedural norms. Rather, a moral perspective must embody some substantive norms derived from a particular content-full moral or theological perspective. The substantive norms to which I appeal in (...) this article are those of Roman Catholicism. The most important sources cited include the works of Pius XII and the works of John Paul II. The conclusion reached is that not only is it morally permissible for Catholics to participate in a market in organ sales but it may also be prudent public policy. (shrink)

This essay begins by distinguishing among the viewpoints of philosophy, theology, and religion; it then explores how each deals with “sin” in the bioethical context. The conclusions are that the philosophical and theological viewpoints are intellectually defective in that they cripple our ability to deal with normative issues, and are in the end unable to integrate Christian concepts like “sin” successfully into bioethics. Sin is predicated only of beings with free will, though only in Western Christianity must all sins be (...) committed with knowledge and voluntarily. Without the notions of free will, sin, and a narrative of redemption, bioethics remains unable to provide itself with an adequate normative framework. Bioethics, and morality in general, remain a morass precisely because there has been a failure to translate Christian morality into fully secular and scientistic terms. (shrink)

Nicholas Capaldi; The New Age, Christianity, and Bioethics, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 8, Issue 3, 1 January 2002.

The author uses the essays in this issue as a springboard for making three points. First, he argues that most, if not all, current institutional versions of Christianity have failed to provide a meaningful framework for the spiritual life. Second, he argues that there is no ethics other than Judeo-Christian ethics and that there can be no bioethics other than Judeo-Christian bioethics. Finally, he argues that the overriding issue we face is notwhether to address bioethical issues from a Christian perspective (...) or from a non-Christian perspective, but rather whether we shall address biological and medical issues from an ethical or a scientific-technological perspective. (shrink)

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)

The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such (...) understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory. (shrink)