This paper develops and defends a paradigm-based explanation of respect. Paradigm-based explanations propose to illuminate subject matter that are basically disunified, by identifying a form of them (“the paradigm”) that is then shown to be explanatorily basic to the subject as a whole. This explanatory strategy is well-suited to the subject of respect, which is widely agreed to encompass two distinct kinds, appraisal respect and recognition respect. Accordingly, the paper sets out to determine which of these two kinds is paradigmatic (...) and which, derivative. It begins by advancing a novel account of appraisal respect (“perspectival respect”), which it also hypothesizes is respect in its paradigmatic form. On this hypothesis, perspectival respect is paradigmatic in virtue of its apparent “point” or function, which is that it constitutively aims at understanding another person’s perspective on things. The paper then tests the viability of this hypothesis by showing how one central form of recognition respect (“respect for persons”) can reasonably be understood to derive from respect in its paradigmatic form, by showing how it is illuminated by the aim of interpersonal understanding. (shrink)

Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called ‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect involves abstaini...

Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called ‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect involves abstaining from making or acting on judgements about others. Aside from arguing for its justificatory role, Carter also argues that, in this role, it has a series of implications for our thinking about liberal politics. I argue, first, that the theoretical implications of the view that opacity respect grounds equality (...) are narrower than they first appear. This is because, in order to put the view into action, one must make a certain kind of empirical claim. Second, I show that this point reveals an important structural aspect of Carter’s view, concerning the way that principles can be limited in practice. Third, I argue that the practical implications of the view are potentially much broader than they first appear, threatening absurdity. This is because the position’s repercussions naturally extend into day-to-day transactions. (shrink)

This is an interview by the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics with Ian Carter. The interview covers Carter's intellectual biography; his extensive writings on the measurement and value of freedom; his reflections on the use of formal methods in philosophical work on freedom and in political philosophy more broadly; his more recent work on basic equality and respect for persons; and, finally, his advice to young scholars.

Western societies today are marked by a broad liberal consensus in favor of toleration. Yet, some philosophers have charged that political toleration as a liberal ideal is incoherent. Some have argued that toleration is incompatible with liberal political orders due to egalitarian considerations. Others have suggested that in a truly liberal society, where the state’s justice-based duties of non-interference are the most appropriate response to diversity, political toleration is practically redundant. This article defends political toleration against the above allegations. My (...) goal is twofold: first of all, to formulate a coherent conception of toleration that is fully consistent with the egalitarian spirit of our times and then to demonstrate that, contrary to critics’ claims, political toleration is not an obsolete ideal that belongs to a bygone era. And all this because, I believe, in a liberal constitutional order, political toleration’s specific role is not identical with, and cannot be reduced to, the state’s justice-based duties of non-interference. Accordingly, I argue that political toleration belongs to a specific mode of politics: the extraordinary politics. When the rules of justice are not available, or their application is not feasible, the extraordinary politics, in which toleration plays a role, emerges as the persistent residue of the ordinary politics. Therefore, political toleration and justice-based duties of non-interference should be seen as accompanying practices that represent two modes of politics. (shrink)

According to the ‘starting-gate’ interpretation of equality of opportunity, individuals who enjoy equal starts can legitimately become unequal to the extent that their differences derive from choices for which they can be held responsible. There can be no coercive transfers of resources in favour of individuals who disregarded their own futures, and no limits on the right of an individual to distribute resources intrapersonally. This paper assesses two ways in which advocates of equality of opportunity might depart from the starting-gate (...) interpretation. The first involves limiting the degree to which people are liable to pay the costs of their past choices. The second involves limiting their initial opportunities so as to prevent certain risky or apparently short-sighted choices. The paper compares these alternatives in terms of their compatibility with a particular conception of persons as morally equal and temporally extended. It constructs this conception by combining reductionist premises about personal identity with the premise that our status as equals is based on the fundamental requirement of opacity respect. Two conclusions about equality of opportunity are shown to follow from this conception of persons as morally equal and temporally extended: the first is that an individual’s liability to pay the costs of her past choices does not diminish over time; the second is that the individual’s initial scope of choice, in bringing about intrapersonal distributions between her current and future selves, can nevertheless be permissibly limited. The two conclusions are consistent, and the second allows for departures from starting-gate equality of opportunity. (shrink)

In chapter one I firstly critique some contemporary family-resemblance approaches to the category woman, and claim that they do not take sufficient account of dis-semblance, that is, resemblances that people have in common with members of the contrast category man. Second, I analyze how the concept of woman is semantically contestable: resemblance/dissemblance structures give rise to vagueness and to borderline cases. Borderline cases can either be included in the category or excluded from it. The factors which incline parties in a (...) dispute about membership to include or exclude depend on metaphysical, ethical, or political background assumptions. In chapter two, I begin by considering the harms suffered by transgender persons through “misgendering”, the deployment of gender terms which inflict psychological harms upon transgender persons, place them in situations of injustice, or diminish their self-respect. Such deployments are morally contestable: they can be challenged on ethical grounds. Several characterisations of the term ‘woman’ proposed in the feminist literature are critiqued from this perspective. In chapter three, I elaborate a broadly liberal approach to gender pluralism. The approach involves: i) the public toleration of gender practices and beliefs which contest prevalent gender norms; and ii) state-gender neutrality. Public toleration allows gender non-conforming practices and beliefs within public space. State gender-neutrality consists mainly in the removal from law and government policy of provisions which assume compliance with prevalent conceptions of gender. (shrink)