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Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena

In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 61-85 (2001)

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  1. Why should our mind-reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?Diana I. Pérez - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84.
    In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks (...)
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