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Does the Universe Need God?

In J. B. Stump & Alan G. Padgett (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 185-197 (2012)

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  1. Big Bounce or Double Bang? A Reply to Craig and Sinclair on the Interpretation of Bounce Cosmologies.Daniel Linford - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1849-1871.
    On the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, a preceding universe was compressed to a small size before “bouncing” to form the present expanding universe. William Lane Craig and James Sinclair have argued that the orthodox interpretation is incorrect if the entropy reaches a minimum at the bounce. In their view, the interface between universes represents the birth of two expanding universes, i.e., a “double bang” instead of a “big bounce”. Here, I reply to Craig and Sinclair in defense of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the Carroll–Chen Model.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (1):97-124.
    I argue that the Carroll-Chen cosmogonic model does not provide a plausible scientific explanation of the past hypothesis (the thesis that our universe began in an extremely low-entropy state). I suggest that this counts as a welcomed result for those who adopt a Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best systems account of laws and maintain that the past hypothesis is a brute fact that is a non-dynamical law.
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  • Fine-tuning as evidence for a multiverse: why White is wrong. [REVIEW]Mark Douglas Saward - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):243-253.
    Roger White (God and design, Routledge, London, 2003) claims that while the fine-tuning of our universe, $\alpha $ , may count as evidence for a designer, it cannot count as evidence for a multiverse. First, I will argue that his considerations are only correct, if at all, for a limited set of multiverses that have particular features. As a result, I will argue that his claim cannot be generalised as a statement about all multiverses. This failure to generalise, I will (...)
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