El conocimiento utilizado para armar e implementar políticas socioeconómicas refiere por lo general a aseveraciones causales que pueden ser conceptuadas de diferentes maneras; sin embargo, estas suelen omitir un tema central: las consecuencias alternativas o los desvíos que emergen en caso de fracasar, lo que puede acarrear consecuencias negativas. Se argumenta que, para una buena implementación, es fundamental tener en cuenta dichas consecuencias alternativas, lo cual implica un cambio sustancial en el modo de tomar decisiones, donde la asimetría de resultados (...) es relevante. (shrink)

RESUMEN El conocimiento utilizado para armar e implementar políticas socioeconómicas refiere por lo general a aseveraciones causales que pueden ser conceptuadas de diferentes maneras; sin embargo, estas suelen omitir un tema central: las consecuencias alternativas o los desvíos que emergen en caso de fracasar, lo que puede acarrear consecuencias negativas. Se argumenta que, para una buena implementación, es fundamental tener en cuenta dichas consecuencias alternativas, lo cual implica un cambio sustancial en el modo de tomar decisiones, donde la asimetría de (...) resultados es relevante. ABSTRACT The knowledge used to structure and implement socioeconomic policies generally refers to causal assertions that can be conceptualized differently; however, they tend to disregard the central issue of alternative consequences or deviations that arise in case of failure, which can cause negative effects. The paper argues that a successful implementation entails taking these alternative consequences into account. This implies a substantial change in the way decisions are made, in which the asymmetry of results becomes relevant. (shrink)

The mechanistic and causal accounts of explanation are often conflated to yield a ‘causal-mechanical’ account. This paper prizes them apart and asks: if the mechanistic account is correct, how can causal explanations be explanatory? The answer to this question varies according to how causality itself is understood. It is argued that difference-making, mechanistic, dualist and inferentialist accounts of causality all struggle to yield explanatory causal explanations, but that an epistemic account of causality is more promising in this regard.

The issue of causal comparability in the social sciences underlies matters of both generalization and extrapolation. After critiquing two existing interpretations of comparability, due to Hitchcock and Hausman, I propose a distinction between ontological and epistemic comparability. While the former refers to whether two cases are actually comparable, the latter respects that in cases of incomplete information, we need to rely on whatever evidence we have of comparability. I argue, using a political science case study, that in those cases of (...) imperfect information, an epistemic homogeneity criterion can be an adequate justification for generalization. (shrink)

The existing philosophical views on what is the meaning of causality adequate to medicine are vastly divided. We approach this question and offer two arguments in favor of pluralism regarding concepts of causality. First, we analyze the three main types of research designs (randomized-controlled trials, observational epidemiology and laboratory research). We argue, using examples, that they allow for making causal conclusions that are best understood differently in each case (in agreement with a version of manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic definitions, respectively). (...) Second, we analyze clinical practice and argue that these manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic causal claims can be used as evidence for different therapeutic decisions. We differentiate among ‘predicting’ that does not change the relata of causal claims, (mechanistic) ‘interferences’, and ‘interventions’ in the strict sense that act on causes to change effects. The central conclusion is that causal claims agreeing with diverse concepts of causality can deliver evidence for different types of therapeutic decisions. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that successful evidence-based policy should rely on two kinds of evidence: statistical and mechanistic. The former is held to be evidence that a policy brings about the desired outcome, and the latter concerns how it does so. Although agreeing with the spirit of this proposal, we argue that the underlying conception of mechanistic evidence as evidence that is different in kind from correlational, difference-making or statistical evidence, does not correctly capture the role that information about (...) mechanisms should play in evidence-based policy. We offer an alternative account of mechanistic evidence as information concerning the causal pathway connecting the policy intervention to its outcome. Not only can this be analyzed as evidence of difference-making, it is also to be found at any level and is obtainable by a broad range of methods, both experimental and observational. Using behavioral policy as an illustration, we draw the implications of this revised understanding of mechanistic evidence for debates concerning policy extrapolation, evidence hierarchies, and evidence integration. (shrink)

In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of "open-ended results". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex-ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is (...) proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models. (shrink)

Participatory and collaborative approaches in sustainability science and public health research contribute to co-producing evidence that can support interventions by involving diverse societal actors that range from individual citizens to entire communities. However, existing philosophical accounts of evidence are not adequate to deal with the kind of evidence generated and used in such approaches. In this paper, we present an account of evidence as clues for action through participatory and collaborative research inspired by philosopher Susan Haack’s theory of evidence. Differently (...) from most accounts of evidence for use in policies and interventions, our account combines action-oriented (the how) and actors-oriented (the who) considerations. We build on Haack’s theory and on the analysis of examples of participatory and collaborative research in sustainability science and public health research to flesh out six procedural criteria for the generation and mobilization of evidence in and from participatory research. Action-oriented criteria invite to look at evidence from a (a) foundherentist, (b) gradational and (c) quasi-holistic perspective. Actors-oriented criteria point out that evidence generation and utilization are (d) social, (e) personal, and (f) embedded. We suggest that these criteria may reinforce participatory and collaborative approaches to evidence co-production when addressing complex problems in sustainability science and public health allowing for the generation of a kind of practical objectivity. (shrink)

The paper starts by distinguishing between two kinds of economic practice: theoretical economic practice (TEP) (model and theory building) and direct economic practice (DEP) (the practical operation upon real economies). Most of the epistemological and philosophical considerations have been directed to the first type of practice, one of whose main goals is the discovery of particular sorts of economic laws, mechanisms and other regularities which throw light on relevant economic patterns. We do not deny that in some restricted domains these (...) kinds of regularities may be found. Rather, we claim that the realm of economics is best understood as consisting of processes whose regular structure (if they have one at all) is not guaranteed beforehand but may be crucially influenced and successfully enforced by what we call DEP. We claim that (a) some economic processes are a particular type of social process that will be referred to as Expectations-Based Processes (EBP). Characteristically, an EBP shows a connection between the information that individuals receive from the relevant economic context, the expectations they form, and the actions they perform; (b) in those cases in which EBP exhibit a regular behaviour, they depend on agents' expectations and, crucially, we argue, on interventions upon them. Authorities as well as other economic actors may intervene to change agents' expectations (and therefore, their decisions), contributing to shape EBP and helping to produce the patterns that lead to some targeted economic phenomena. These features of EBP show that they are not shielded from external influences and they do not run autonomously once triggered. Therefore they cannot be conceived as mechanisms or as economic machines. Rather they are open-ended processes that require continuous prodding on the part of policy makers to keep them running in the intended way. (shrink)