Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es realizar un repaso de las teorías de las emociones más importantes de las últimas décadas y valorar en qué medida tales teorías ofrecen una buena caracterización del fenómeno en cuestión. Para alcanzar una comprensión adecuada de las diferentes teorías, así como del rumbo que ha tomado el debate actual sobre las emociones, es importante que prestemos especial atención a algunos de los compromisos filosóficos involucrados en la formulación de estas teorías. La revisión cuidadosa (...) de algunos de estos compromisos nos llevará a plantearnos si algunas de las dificultades a las que se enfrentan varias de las teorías de las emociones actuales podrían tener origen en tales compromisos filosóficos y no, como suele pensarse, en la complejidad de las emociones.: The aim of this paper is to review the most important theories of emotions in recent decades and to assess the extent to which these theories provide a good characterisation of the phenomenon in question. In order to achieve an appropriate understanding of the different theories, as well as of the direction that the current debate on emotions has taken, it is important that we pay special attention to some of the philosophical commitments involved in the formulation of these theories. Careful examination of some of these commitments will lead us to consider whether some of the difficulties faced by several of the current theories of emotions might stem from such philosophical commitments rather than, as is often thought, from the complexity of emotions. Palabras clave: episodios, intencionalidad, fenomenología, propiedades evaluativas. Keywords: episodes, intentionality, phenomenology, evaluative properties. (shrink)

Rational explanation of action out of emotion faces a number of challenges. The Wrong Explanation Challenge says that explaining action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion gets it wrong. The Redundancy Challenge says that if explanation of an action by reference to emotion is sufficient then rational explanation is redundant. And the No Further Justification Challenge says that there is no more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about why people act as (...) they do out of a particular emotion. Furthermore, even if these challenges can be addressed, there is a Problem of Expressive Action, since many actions out of emotion seem unpromising candidates for being guided by normative practical reasons of the prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist sort. In response, I argue that many actions out of emotions should be understood as expressive actions guided by the agent's conception of normative practical reasons: specifically, their conception of expressive reasons. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Steve Clarke (2017) identifies two different bases for conscience-based refusals in healthcare: (1) all-things-considered moral judgments, and (2) the dictates of conscience. He argues that these two bases have distinct roles in justifying conscientious objection. However, accepting that there are these two bases, I argue that both are not able to justify conscientious objection. In particular, I argue that the second basis of the dictates of conscience cannot justify conscience-based refusal in a healthcare (...) context. Even if someone objects in a healthcare context on the basis of the dictates of her conscience, and even if we can explain why she objects with reference to the dictates of her conscience, her objection will only be justified if she makes a judgment. (shrink)