Judith Jarvis Thomson argued that abortion is permissible because no one must sacrifice their rights to bodily autonomy. However, assuming a fetus has full moral personhood, and focusing on when abortion is unjust in particular, we argue that Thomson's view of what we ought to sacrifice to aid others is too impoverished. Instead, we argue that abortion is permissible when pregnancy threatens the ability of the mother, or the child, to live minimally well. After explaining the minimally good life account (...) and its application to abortion, we explain its advantages over alternative views. Finally, we examine arguments concluding that abortion is permissible because fetuses are not persons. We argue that personhood is probably a matter of degree rather than a binary property. Thus, abortion is generally permissible early in pregnancy, but as the fetus gets closer to full personhood, adopting the minimally good life standard is appropriate. (shrink)