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  1. Review of John Lemos’ A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will. [REVIEW]Richard Double - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):299-306.
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  • Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal (...)
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  • Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence.Derk Pereboom - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97.
    The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized (...)
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  • Autism Spectrum Condition, Good and Bad Motives of Offending, and Sentencing.Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article aims (...)
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  • Criminal Quarantine and the Burden of Proof.Michael Corrado - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1095-1110.
    In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of (...)
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  • Neuroenhancement, the Criminal Justice System, and the Problem of Alienation.Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    It has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of (...)
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  • Free Will Fallibilism and the “Two-Standpoints” Account of Freedom.Michael Louis Corrado - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a (...)
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