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Cornerstones: You’d better believe them.Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.details
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Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.details
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El Esencialismo Individuativo de Wiggins y la Función de los Juicios de Modalidad De Re.José Edgar González Varela - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:55-82.details
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Knowledge, equilibrium and convention.P. Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (3):337-369.details
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Pragmatics in Carnap and Morris and the Bipartite Metatheory Conception.Thomas Uebel - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):523-546.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Intensionality and paradoxes in ramsey’s ‘the foundations of mathematics’.Dustin Tucker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (1):1-25.details
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Sentences, semantics, stimuli, and Quine.Robert J. Titiev - 1975 - Theoria 41 (1):1-10.details
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Heidegger on Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.John Tietz - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (1):59-.details
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Philosophical logic and artificial intelligence.Richmond Thomason - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (4):321 - 327.details
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Non-Descriptivism About Modality. A Brief History And Revival.Amie Thomasson - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4:8.details
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Frege's Hierarchies of Indirect Senses and the Paradox of Analysis.Terence D. Parsons - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):37-58.details
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Indicative introduction.Paul Teller - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):173 - 195.details
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Meaning, Understanding, and A Priori Knowledge.Célia Teixeira - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):901-916.details
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Truth and proof: The platonism of mathematics.W. W. Tait - 1986 - Synthese 69 (3):341 - 370.details
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Ordinary language semantics: the contribution of Brentano and Marty.Hamid Taieb - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):777-796.details
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Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.details
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The determination of content.Zoltán Szabó - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):253 - 272.details
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The importance of nonexistent objects and of intensionality in mathematics.Richard Sylvan - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):20-52.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Language, Ontology, and the Carnap-Quine Debate.Jonathan Surovell - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):811-833.details
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Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication.Jonathan Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2519-2539.details
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Predicate Change: A Study on the Conservativity of Conceptual Change.Corina Strößner - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1159-1183.details
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Fictional names and individual concepts.Andreas Stokke - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7829-7859.details
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Paying the price for methodological solipsism.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-98.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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Was Carnap entirely wrong, after all?Howard Stein - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):275-295.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations.Jer Steeger - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1295-1325.details
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Comments on Donald Davidson's Paper “Radical Interpretation”.Erik Stenius - 1976 - Dialectica 30 (1):35-60.details
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Abductive two-dimensionalism: a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths.Biggs Stephen & Wilson Jessica - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):59-93.details
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Constructing Meanings.Jason Stanley - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):662-676.details
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“Assertion” and intentionality.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.details
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Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth.Wolfgang Spohn - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1335-1359.details
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Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):182-214.details
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Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification.Torben Spaak - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (4):469-485.details
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Revisability, a priori truth, and evolution.Elliott Sober - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):68 – 85.details
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Actually.Scott Soames - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):251-277.details
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Actually.Scott Soames - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):251-277.details
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Dilthey and Carnap: The Feeling of Life, the Scientific Worldview, and the Elimination of Metaphysics.Eric S. Nelson - 2018 - In Johannes Feichtinger, Franz L. Fillafer & Jan Surman (eds.), The Worlds of Positivism: A Global Intellectual History, 1770–1930. Palgrave.details
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Indexical sense and reference.David Woodruff Smith - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):101 - 127.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Computational processes, representations and propositional attitudes.J. J. C. Smart - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-97.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Objectivism and the study of man (part I).Hans Skjervheim - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):213 – 239.details
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