Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Expected choiceworthiness and fanaticism.Calvin Baker - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).
    Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payoff options. Proponents of MEC have offered two main lines of response. The first is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The AI-design regress.Pamela Robinson - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (1):229-255.
    How should we design AI systems that make moral decisions that affect us? When there is disagreement about which moral decisions should be made and which methods would produce them, we should avoid arbitrary design choices. However, I show that this leads to a regress problem similar to the one metanormativists face involving higher orders of uncertainty. I argue that existing strategies for handling this parallel problem give verdicts about where to stop in the regress that are either too arbitrary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark