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  1. Commuting probability revisions: The uniformity rule. [REVIEW]Carl G. Wagner - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):349-364.
    A simple rule of probability revision ensures that the final result ofa sequence of probability revisions is undisturbed by an alterationin the temporal order of the learning prompting those revisions.This Uniformity Rule dictates that identical learning be reflectedin identical ratios of certain new-to-old odds, and is grounded in the oldBayesian idea that such ratios represent what is learned from new experiencealone, with prior probabilities factored out. The main theorem of this paperincludes as special cases (i) Field's theorem on commuting probability-kinematical (...)
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  • Probability Kinematics and Probability Dynamics.Lydia McGrew - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:89-105.
    Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist has in giving a principled answer to the question of when the conditions (...)
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  • Rescuing Reflection.Ilho Park - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):473-489.
    In this article, I suggest an argument that seems to show a conflict between the reflection principle and conditionalization. In particular, I show that when the reflection principle is formulated in a standard way, the principle conflicts with Jeffrey conditionalization. And it is argued that the source of the conflict resides in an ambiguity of the standard formulation. Furthermore, I attempt to rescue the principle using Bayes factors. That is, I suggest a new formulation of the principle so as to (...)
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  • The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation.Carl G. Wagner - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):343-350.
    The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.
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