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On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency

In Marco Ruffino, Max Freund & Max Fernández de Castro (eds.), Logic and philosophy of logic. Recent trends from Latin America and Spain. College Publications. pp. 48-74 (2018)

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  1. Interpreting philosophical interpretations of paraconsistency.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-21.
    In this paper, we critically discuss the idea of a ‘philosophical interpretation’ of paraconsistent logics. We do so by considering the epistemic approach to paraconsistency, by Carnielli and Rodrigues, according to which paraconsistent logics should be interpreted exclusively in terms of non-conclusive evidence, and also, by considering counter-arguments by Barrio and Barrio and Da Re, according to whom paraconsistent logics are not specially tied to any specific interpretation. We begin by presenting the positions involved, and by arguing that the debate (...)
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  • The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence.Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11537-11559.
    In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions; instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions, it is suggested that we may understand such situations as involving only conflicting evidence, which restricts contradictions to a notion of evidence weaker than truth. In this paper, we first distinguish two conflicting programs entangled in the proposal: interpreting paraconsistency in general through the notion (...)
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  • Models & Proofs: LFIs Without a Canonical Interpretations.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):87-112.
    In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...)
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