The project of integrated HPS has occupied philosophers of science in one form or another since at least the 1960s. Yet, despite this substantial interest in bringing together philosophical and historical reflections on the nature of science, history of science and formal philosophy of science remain as divided as ever. In this paper, I will argue that the continuing separation between historical and formal philosophy of science is ill-founded. I will argue for this in both abstract and concrete terms. At (...) the abstract level, I reconstruct two possible arguments for the incompatibility of historical and formal philosophy of science and argue that they are both wanting. At the concrete level, I discuss how historical and formal philosophy of science have been brought together in practice, namely: in the form of a largely forgotten research tradition that I will refer to here as the study of formalized macro-units. After a brief exposition, I argue that this research tradition has been unduly overlooked by historically minded philosophers of science. Bringing together these observations, I argue that the divide between historical and formal philosophy of science is not grounded in any substantive arguments, but can be primarily attributed to disciplinary happenstance. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

Dogmatic, naive and sophisticated falsificationism are construed as being distinguished by different views on the revisability of scientific theories. Then Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs (SRP) is reinterpreted: The structure of an SRP is a target theory equipped with a priority structure for hypothetical revisions that accommodate idealizing assumptions. Idealizations pointing "backwards" capture predecessor theories, thus showing both their virtues and limitations. The core of an SRP is assigned top priority; its positive heuristics consists in a strategy of how (...) to work off the idealizing assumptions. In the dynamics of SRP's, progressive intertheoretic relations within an SRP are characterized as generating continuity through revisions, while those that hold across SRP's only have excess empirical content. Finally, we contrast our account with a reconstruction of Lakatos's in the structuralist philosophy of science (W. Stegmüller). (shrink)