Switch to: References

Citations of:

Property-level causation?

Philosophical Studies 63 (3):245 - 270 (1991)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    In this dissertation, I develop and defend a model of causation that allows for dualist mental causation in worlds where the physical domain is physically complete. In Part I, I present the dualist ontology that will be assumed throughout the thesis and identify two challenges for models of mental causation within such an ontology: the exclusion worry and the common cause worry. I also argue that a proper response to these challenges requires a thoroughly lightweight account of causation, i.e. an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Singularist Semirealism.Bence Nanay - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):371-394.
    This paper proposes to carve out a new position in the scientific realism/antirealism debate and argue that it captures some of the most important realist and some of the most important antirealist considerations. The view, briefly stated, is that there is always a fact of the matter about whether the singular statements science gives us are literally true, but there is no fact of the matter about whether the non-singular statements science gives us are literally true. I call this view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The mishap at Reichenbach fall: Singular vs. general causation.Christopher Hitchcock - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Hitchcock’s treatment of singular and general causation.Christian Jakob - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287.
    Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The unanimity theory and probabilistic sufficiency.John W. Carroll - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):471-479.
    The unanimity theory is an account of property-level causation requiring that causes raise the probability of their effects in specified test situations. Richard Otte (1981) and others have presented counterexamples in which one property is probabilistically sufficient for at least one other property. Given the continuing discussion (e.g., Cartwright 1989; Cartwright and Dupre 1988; Eells 1988a,b), many apparently think that these problems are minor. By considering the impact of Otte's cases on recent versions of the theory, by raising several new (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation