The paper is the final, fifth part of a series of studies introducing the new conceptions of “Hilbert mathematics” and “ontomathematics”. The specific subject of the present investigation is the proper philosophical sense of both, including philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of physics not less than the traditional “first philosophy” (as far as ontomathematics is a conservative generalization of ontology as well as of Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” though in a sense) and history of philosophy (deepening Heidegger’s destruction of it from (...) the pre-Socratics to the Pythagoreans). Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s derivative “fundamental ontology” as well as his later doctrine after the “turn” are the starting point of the research as established and well known approaches relative to the newly introduced conception of ontomathematics, even more so that Husserl himself started criticizing his “Philosophy of arithmetic” as too naturalistic and psychological turning to “Logical investigations” and the foundations of phenomenology. Heidegger’s “Aletheia” is also interpreted ontomathematically: as a relation of locality and nonlocality, respectively as a motion from nonlocality to locality if both are physically considered. Aristotle’s ontological revision of Plato’s doctrine is “destructed” further from the pre-Socratics' “Logos” or Heideger’s “Language” (after the “turn”) to the Pythagoreans “Numbers” or “Arithmetics” as an inherent and fundamental philosophical doctrine. Then, a leap to contemporary physics elucidates the essence of ontomathematics overcoming the Cartesian abyss inherited from Plato’s opposition of “ideas” versus “things”, and now unifying physics and mathematics, particularly allowing for the “creation from nothing” instead of the quasi-scientific myth of the “Big Bang”. Furthermore, ontomathematics needs another interpretation of arithmetic, propositional logic and set theory in the foundations of mathematics, where the latter two ones are both identified with Boolean algebra, and the former is considered to be a “half of Boolean algebra” in the exact meaning to be equated to it after doubling by a dual anti-isometric counterpart of Peano arithmetic. That unified algebraic realization of the foundations of mathematics is related to Hilbert mathematics in both “narrow and wide senses” where the latter is isomorphic to the qubit Hilbert space, thus underlying all the physical world by the newly introduced substance of quantum information being physically dimensionless and generalizing classical information measured in bits. The substance of information, whether classical or quantum, visualizes the way of the unification of physics and mathematics by merging their foundations in Hilbert arithmetic and Hilbert mathematics: thus how ontomathetics is a “first philosophy”. The relation of ontomathematics to the Socratic “human problematics”, furthermore being fundamental for Western philosophy in Modernity, is discussed. Ontomathematics implies its “substitution” by abstract information (or by “subjectless choice” relevant to it), thus “obliterating the human outline on the ocean beach sand” (by Michel Foucault’s metaphor). A reflection back from the viewpoint of mathematic to Western philosophy as the philosophy of locality ends the study. (shrink)

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the (...) Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch. (shrink)

The essay deals with the brief yet significant correspondence between Martin Heidegger and Werner Heisenberg throughout the year 1953 that culminated in Heidegger’s lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik”. The letters and Heidegger’s accompanying thoughts about the production of scientific evidence by means of media technology and mathematics provides a missing link between the genesis of Heidegger’s own philosophy of technology and the history of modern physics. The correspondence indicates the struggle of both philosopher and physicist to understand each other (...) but also Heidegger’s awareness for the necessity of an interdisciplinary discourse on technology within the nuclear era. One of Heisenberg’s letters worked through by Heidegger with crayons is published here for the first time. (shrink)

The paper suggests a critique of scientism by revealing the existential genesis of knowledge-constitutive interests in scientific research. This scenario of overcoming scientism is spelled out in terms of the doctrine of cognitive existentialism. On the doctrine?s central claim, a knowledge-constitutive interest is not fixed and determined by a strongly situated epistemic position that is distinguished by invariant norms of theorizing, methodological devices, cognitive aims, goals, and values. In reflecting upon its situated transcendence, scientific research has a potentiality for discarding (...) that form of objectivist realism which is pre-supposed by the ideology of scientism. The paper develops arguments against the essentialist picture of scientific research shared by philosophers as different as Heidegger and Habermas. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s writings on modern science as well as his stray remarks on communication are important theoretical resources to understand the character and contour of, and our response to the Anthropocene epoch. John Caputo distinguishes between the early hermeneutic account of science in Heidegger’s corpus and the later deconstructive account, claiming that the former would have sufficed to fulfil the critical task of the latter without its pejorative and dismissive reading of modern science. Accepting Caputo’s distinction but rejecting his critique (...) of the deconstructive account, this paper argues that Heidegger’s abandoning of the hermeneutic account was premised on the refusal of the Western metaphysical baggage that still pervades and is endorsed in that account, a baggage which is now leading to the Anthropocene epoch and the consequent ontological communication of distress. The deconstructive approach evokes the communication of scientific phenomena in plural ways such as fictional, poetical and metaphorical narratives, thus undercutting the reductionist and monolithic character of modern science. (shrink)

O artigo busca discutir as concepções de ciência nos pensamentos tardios de Heidegger e Heisenberg. Ambos, o físico e o filósofo, sugerem que o mundo técnico-científico nos impõe a tarefa de repensar o posicionamento humano em meio às coisas, sustentando que tal tarefa não poderia ser executada apenas pelo ser humano, devendo antes ser guiada por uma instância mais original da verdade. Entretanto, enquanto Heisenberg acredita que a ciência pode alcançar aquilo que ele denomina de “ordem interna do mundo”, Heidegger, (...) ao contrário, toma a ciência como um pensamento não essencial, na medida em que ela não percebe a sua própria essência e passa ao largo da “verdade do ser”. O artigo encerra com a questão de saber se a desumanização da ciência sugerida por Heidegger e Heisenberg, a pesar da acuidade e profundidade de seus diagnósticos sobre o mundo tecnológico, não impediria um diálogo entre ciência e filosofia. (shrink)