This paper explores Jean‐Luc Nancy's philosophical reflection on surviving his own heart transplant. In ‘The Intruder’, he raises central questions concerning the relations between what he refers to as a ‘proper’ life, that is, a life that is thought to be one's own singular ‘lived experience’, and medical techniques, shaped at this particular historical juncture by cyclosporine or immuno‐suppresssion. He describes the temporal nature of an ever‐increasing sense of strangeness and fragmentation which accompanies his heart transplant. In doing so, Nancy (...) opens up the concealed of transplantation in terms of the problematic ‘gift’ of a ‘foreign’ organ, the unremitting suffering intrusiveness of the treatment regimen, and the living of life as ‘bare life’. He uncovers and exposes the relentless uncanniness that pervades the post‐transplant experience, which for him is an example of our humanistic, never‐ending impulse, to alter ourselves. Nevertheless, Nancy offers no answer to this dilemma, but instead calls us to think about the meaning or ‘sense’ of the prolonging of life and deferring of death, which currently drives our medical interventions. (shrink)

In this interview Samuel Weber proposes a rethinking of the relation of secrecy to transparency and outlines some of the forms it takes, while considering certain of its implications for current social, political and epistemological contexts. He begins by questioning the opposition itself, suggesting that we will have to learn to be more at home with the secret and that the demand for transparency must be radically rethought and complicated. He argues that the demand for absolute transparency can only promote (...) and obscure the process by which the ‘secret’ is placed in the service of private appropriation. As the emotional experience of the relation between transparency and secrecy reflects the historically specific traditions that constitute the sense of self, then it is that sense that should be ‘opened up to its irreducible heterogeneity’. (shrink)

The literary and critical discourse about characters and characterization in Anglophone drama and fiction since the Renaissance shows a persistent but underrecognized presence of three idioms and vocabularies, two highly developed and one nascent, that either derive from the rhetoric of mathematics in classical antiquity or participate in its modern afterlife. Those discourses—which this article studies in detail—are, first, an explicitly Theophrastan one, in which taxonomies of character are constructed; second, an explicitly Euclidean one, in which characterization is discussed and (...) accomplished in relatively conventional or commonsensical geometric terms; and third, a non- or post-Euclidean one, in which characterization is discussed and inchoately accomplished in the terms of the “new geometries” that emerged during the nineteenth century. What taxonomy in the Aristotelian mode and geometry in the Euclidean mode have in common is that when their vocabularies are applied to characterization, they delimit characters in terms of established categories—whether of ideal shapes or statistically probable types—while discounting whatever features may be unique to individuals. An obliviousness to these three discourses can limit seriously what can be said about, and what can be said on behalf of, the literary and critical texts framed in their terms and also, most importantly, what can be said about the nature of literary characters. (shrink)

This special issue reconsiders the contributions that phenomenology can make to the development and practice of a clinicat science of psychology. In it, we suggest that earlier attempts to apply phenomenological principles were influenced heavily by psychoanalysis, with few, if any, alternative versions of a "depth" psychology available on which to draw in reframing the nature of psychopathology and its treatment. We suggest that this lingering presence of psychoanalysis runs counter to the founding principles of phenomenological method and offer a (...) few examples of a constructive alternative grounded in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Borrowing from Mohanty, we offer this approach as a respectful-as opposed to suspicious-phenomenology, and begin to outline ways in which a transcendental ly-grounded psychology reconceptualizes both clinical research and practice, from the initial intake interview and interpretation of interview data to the aims and strategies of psychological interventions. (shrink)