Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) fut un des derniers grands esprits encyclopédiques de l’Allemagne du tournant du xxe siècle. Adepte d’une psychologie scientifique, il établit dès le début des années 1860 une distinction opérationnelle entre la Psychologie expérimentale et la Völkerpsychologie. Les intellectuels français (e.g. Ribot, Durkheim) vont rapidement être séduits tout d’abord par son œuvre physiologique, puis surtout par son œuvre psychologique et être intéressés par son approche philosophique et métaphysique. Mais il n’est resté que peu de choses jusqu’à présent dans (...) la pensée psychologique, sociologique et philosophique françaises de l’œuvre de Wundt, qui mériterait néanmoins un ré-examen approfondi. (shrink)

It is often said that the advent of the Freudian talking cure around 1900 revolutionised the psychiatric setting by giving patients a voice. Less known is that for decades prior to the popularisation of this technique, several researchers had been experimenting with another, written practice aimed at probing the mind. This was particularly the case in France. Alongside neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s spectacular staging of hypnotised bodies, ‘automatic writing’ became widely used in fin-de-siècle clinics and laboratories, with French psychologists regularly asking (...) entranced patients to scribble down words to validate their nascent theories on the divided self. This article traces the emergence of automatic writing in French psychological discourse at the close of the 19th century. By focusing on the early work of Dr Pierre Janet and some of his contemporaries, it re-examines the role played by this practice in what Henri Ellenberger famously called ‘The Discovery of the Unconscious’. It also considers the various levels of reconstruction at play in recent historical accounts. What does it mean to give subjects a (written) voice? How does automatic writing differ from the Freudian talking cure as respective expressions of the unspeakable? And how might these questions inform future historical practice? (shrink)

Most histories of psychology weave a story around the rise of objective methods of investigation and the decline of subjective introspection. This paper sidesteps such disciplinary stories by describing self-scrutiny as a practice that moved through a variety of cultural, social and technological contexts in early twentieth-century America. Edmund Jacobson's technique of 'progressive relaxation' is offered as a case in point. Jacobson, a Chicago clinician, developed this cure for nervousness out of his earlier research under E. B. Titchener, an experimental (...) psychologist at Cornell University. Like Titchener's method of 'experimental introspection ', progressive relaxation was a laboratory-based activity designed to transform the practitioner's sensibilities through the fastidious repetition of simple tasks. But while experimental psychologists ultimately rejected introspection as the core of their disciplinary project, the American public embraced progressive relaxation as a practical technique for mastering the new conditions of modernity. (shrink)

À lafin du XVIII e siècle, lemédecin et philosophe allemand Ernst Platner, en rapportant une observation faite sur un aveugle-né, affirme qu’un homme privé de la vue depuis la naissance ne peut pas posséder la catégorie de l’espace. Cette courte observation s’affirme bientôt comme référence privilégiée du débat sur la nature acquise ou innée de la connaissance. L’une des principales contributions publiées en France est le texte de Jules Lachelier sur la genèse de la notion d’espace. Texte fort peu connu (...) de la production de l’auteur, « L’Observation de Platner » (1903) renferme des vues originales sur la question. Sur la base d’une connaissance approfondie du débat psychologique de l’époque, Lachelier donne ici une nouvelle forme aux positions spiritualistes formulées sur le problème, en finissant par reconceptualiser le dualisme entre nativisme et empirisme. (shrink)

The development of psychology includes the rejection of concepts and movements some groups consider undesirable, such as psychical research. One such example was the way psychologists dealt with phenomena such as telepathy and mediumship in the first five international congresses of psychology held between 1889 and 1905. This included papers about telepathy and mediumship by individuals such as Gabriel Delanne, Léon Denis, Théodore Flournoy, Paul Joire, Léon Marillier, Frederic W. H. Myers, Julian Ochorowicz, Charles Richet, Eleanor M. Sidgwick, and Henry (...) Sidgwick. These topics were eventually rejected from the congresses, and provide us with an example of the boundary-work psychologists were engaging during the period to build their discipline. The height of such presentations took place at the 1900 congress, after which there was a marked decline in discussion on the topic that mirrored the rejection science at large showed for psychical research during the period in question. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze Pierre Janet’s interpretation of Maine de Biran’s notion of the “unconscious” through a comparative study between L’automatisme psychologique (1889) and some Biranian writings devoted to the problem of pure affections. The objective is to question whether Janet’s psychological reading of this very notion had been faithful to Biran’s intentions, and to understand what kind of Biranism Janet is referring to when dealing with the problem of the unconscious.

This essay focuses on the meaning that the term “experimental” acquires within spiritualism during the second half of the nineteenth century. It builds upon Paul Janet’s notions of “experience” and “experimentation” in psychology, by stressing the role of physiology and pathology in his reflection. Regardless of the role the concept of “experimentalism” took on in Victor Cousin’s psychology, which arguably indicated more an “internal affection” than actual experimentation, in Janet’s spiritualism the term regains its original meaning of empirical verification. Janet (...) highlights the importance of madness to the development of a new psychological paradigm that could reconcile philosophy and medicine, reason and experience, by taking up pathology as a form of natural and indirect experimentation. (shrink)