Such are those thick & gloomie shadows dampe Oft seene in charnel vaults, & sepulchers, Lingering, & sitting by a new made grave, As loath to leave the bodie that it lov'd, & link’t it selfe by carnall sensualtie To a degenerate, & degraded state.

IntroductionThe identity thesis asserts that for every psychological state P there is a neural state N such that P=N. In the hope of rendering IT clear and plausible many identity theorists have compared psycho-neural identity claims to such theoretical identities as temperature is identical with molecular mean kinetic energy. However such a comparison admits a weak and a strong interpretation. According to the weak interpretation, psycho-neural identities are said to be like theoretical identities in the sense that the former are (...) contingent claims just as the latter are presumed to be. Identity theorists have appealed to the contingent status of IT in order to meet prima facie objections of the following sort. We can imagine ourselves undergoing a pain, although we are not undergoing the neural process which the identity theorist claims is identical with the pain. Indeed we can imagine ourselves being in pain and yet not having a brain at all. Hence IT is false. Identity theorists have replied by arguing that this objection merely shows that IT is not a necessary truth, or that psychological and neurological terms do not have the same meaning. (shrink)

On 11thOctober 2007, at the first international conference on Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS1) hosted by the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh, Ernan McMullin (University of Notre Dame) portrayed a rather gloomy scenario concerning the current relationship between history and philosophy of science (HPS), on the one hand, and mainstream philosophy, on the other hand, as testified by a significant drop in the presence of HPS papers at various meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA).

In the present paper, the author aims at laying the foundations of a symbolics of technical gesture, according to the thesis that symbolic faculty is another face of the technological one, and that they are both in truth two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, the author suggests to rename the whole dimen-sion as “meta-environmentality”. The analysis is carried out on the basis of a specific comparison between Cassirer’s definition of “animal symbolicum” and its scientific consistence in the light of (...) modern palaeontology. “Animal symbol-icum” is here compared with Leroi-Gourhan’s homo technologicus, and Cassi-rer’s ideas on human identity tested starting from paleoanthropological data. The result of the inquiry lead us to recognize the urgency of integrating Cassi-rer’s argument with the primacy of the technological capacity, but a deep anal-ysis of the characterizing attributes of the latter compels us to uphold the symbolic attitude of the technological dimension. The author then sketches a basic description of the guidelines of a symbolic theory of technology, and tries to show how the basic elements of such an approach were familiar both to Cassirer and Leroi-Gourhan. As a consequence of the whole theory, the author elaborates a chronological analysis of human identity, whose basic result is the determination of the future as main temporal dimen-sion of human acting. (shrink)

This paper analyses the features of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, which Kant himself described as transcendental idealism. On the one hand, Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. On the other hand, our ‘mode of cognition’ [Critique, B25] cognition is representative in that is based on representations — subjective and objective ones. A synthesis of the above considerations suggests that Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the conceptual triad “[objective] object — appearance — and [mental] representation “. Kant’s (...) transcendentalism is impossible without the ‘premise’ of appearance. The correct interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy should keep the double difference of appearance both from thing–in–itself and representation. In this transcendental triad, the Kantian appearance has an intermediate status since it is located between objective things and subjective representations. However, the conceptual status of the appearance needs to be clarified, since Kant himself does not give a clear answer to this question, and at present there are several interpretations, differing primarily in the definition of the concept of the appearance. For me, appearance can be correlated with objective–objectual representation. It would be unwise to identify appearance with thing in itself, which was characteristic of pre–Kantian philosophy, or appearance with representation, which was the case in phenomenalist interpretations of transcendental idealism à la Berkley. The Kantian appearance, as emphasised in BXXVII of his Critique, is an appearance of an object, which — although implicitly — suggests a semantic relationship of reference. In this case, the appearance is not an object, but just ‘a designation of an object’ [Critique, B235]. Appearance is impossible without what appears in it. This paper puts forward a number of arguments in favour of the objectual status of Kant’s concept of appearance. (shrink)

A new understanding of the objectifying process in science is gained if one considers it in the framework of the open, dynamical and holistic model of knowledge developed by Ernst Cassirer to overcome the problems of Kantian epistemology, which allows to consider transitoriness and contingency as integral parts of knowledge. Using physics as a concrete example it is examined, how the fundamental tasks of constitution and justification of knowledge can be understood differently within this model and to what extent this (...) allows to clarify still controversial interpretational questions (especially in quantum mechanics). Therein the creation of symbolical order -patterns and the purely pragmatic confirmation of even the foundations of knowledge are of central relevance. (shrink)

Philosophy now finds itself in a multipolar world, defined by global commercial, scientific and cultural exchange. At any given point in this world, a multitude of norms, traditions, and habits come together in many ways. ›The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms‹ developed by E. Cassirer offers many insights that help to understand the fabric of such a world, but it needs to be revised and critically developed. This book seeks to extract the essential insights of Cassirer concerning the key function of (...) the symbolic in human life, and to develop them in light of other, more socially grounded philosophy, and of sources from the Japanese traditions. (shrink)